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1. INTRODUCTION 
Virtually all decision-making in agricultural production 
is subject to risk and uncertainty. Risk is characterized as 
a situation where an outcome is not known but probabilities 
of all possible outcomes are (or can be) known. Uncertainty 
is defined as a situation when these probabilities cannot 
even be meaningfully defined (Knight,1921). 
The numerous sources of risk that a farm operator faces 
can be grouped under the two broad headings: business risk 
and financial risk . The sources of risk commonly referred to 
as business risk include (1) production (technical) risk, (2) 
market (price) risk, (3) technological risk, (4) legal and 
social risks, and finally (5) human sources of risk. Finan-
cial risk represents an added variability of income due to 
fixed obligations resulting from debt financing. Financial 
risk embodies both solvency and liquidity risks. The trade-
off between business and financial risk is a well accepted 
concept in economics . To put it simply, each farm has a 
certain risk-bearing capacity given by the type, location, 
and financial structure of its operation. The more business 
risk is assumed, the less room remains for financial risk, 
and vice versa. 
There are several different approaches to eliminate or, 
more realistically, to manage the amount of risk inherent in 
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agricultural production. Various production, marketing, and 
financial strategies as well as improved decision-making can 
be combined in order to bring the amount of risk to some 
bearable level. Production strategies include region and 
enterprise selection, diversification, geographic dispersion 
of cropland, technical practices, supplemental irrigation, 
and substituting capital inputs for labor. Managing risk 
through marketing tools means selecting enterprise mix with a 
low expected price variability, maintaining eligibility for 
government programs, inventory management, using forward 
pricing, investing in market information and learning, sprea-
ding sales over time, and finally contracting to purchase 
inputs. Finally, financial responses to risk entail main-
taining additional liquidity, leasing assets, or purchasing 
crop insurance. 
Hence, crop insurance is one of the tools that can 
reduce business risk exposure, production risk in particular. 
Crop insurance works through the so called pooling effects. 
It reduces the uncertainty of risk of loss for an individual 
as well as evens out the burden of the actual loss of crops. 
Crop insurance distributes the risk of low crop yields over 
space and over time (Ray,1981). 
Crop insurance can be designed to protect against a 
single peril (such as hail) or against multiple perils. The 
single peril crop insurance offered by private companies has 
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a long history in the United States and the industry as a 
whole has been quite profitable. On the other hand, attempts 
to provide multiple peril crop insurance through private 
companies has not proven very successful . Several economists 
have argued that public crop insurance against multiple 
perils has a much better chance to withstand widespread crop 
shortfalls. In the United States, this form of crop insur-
ance is provided by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation 
(FCIC). The FCIP has been often criticized for low partici-
pation rates and high administrative costs . Federal Crop 
Insurance (FCI) premiums and the availability of government 
disaster programs have been most frequently identified as the 
underlying causes of low participation. The goal of this 
study is to show that factors beyond FCI premiums and disas-
ter programs influence farmers' decision to participate in 
the FCIP. The following section discusses the history and 
current issues of the Federal Crop Insurance Program (FCIP). 
Federal crop Insurance Program 
The Federal Crop Insurance Program (FCIP) provides a 
subsidized multiple peril crop insurance available to farmers 
regardless of their participation in other government pro-
grams . It was introduced in 1938 and from 1948 to 1980 
operated on an experimental basis. The Federal Crop Insur-
ance Act of 1980 redesigned and extended the FCIP. The FCIP 
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was intended to be the primary means for disaster protection 
for farmers. In part this policy change was taken to elimi-
nate arbitrary disaster payments. However, up to this date, 
it has proven very difficult, politically, to abandon 
disaster assistance completely. Because of the low number of 
farmers insured by FCI, widespread crop failures affecting 
several States at the same time usually create a strong 
political pressure on the government to pass disaster 
payment programs in that particular year. For instance, 
massive crop shortfalls occurred in the U.S. in 1983 and 
1988. In both years, the government awarded farmers disaster 
payments in order to ease the negative impact of massive crop 
losses. 
Under the current conditions, all counties with signifi-
cant agricultural production and most crops are eligible for 
Federal Crop Insurance (FCI). In 1992, Federal crop Insur-
ance purchases covered 55 different crops in 48 states and 
over 83 million acres of agricultural land (NCIS) . The FCIP 
is currently administered through private insurance companies 
that are i n turn reinsured by the FCIC. The current FCIP 
makes several protection levels available to farmers. Farm-
ers can choose from four coverage levels (35, 50, 65, 75 % of 
a base yield) as well as from different prices. The 
calculation of premiums is based on individual farmer's 
actual production history (APH) yields. Where 10 years of 
5 
actual farm data are not available, the calculation is based 
on county level data. Loss payments are based on an 
individual yield shortfall. The program can benefit 
participating farmers in numerous ways. Farmers willing to 
participate in crop insurance are required to pay insurance 
premiums. In return, crop insurance reduces the probability 
and magnitude of a possible loss. Results of several 
empirical studies showed that participation in FCI reduces 
farm income variability, increases net average after-tax 
income, decreases number of years with negative income, 
lowers need for borrowing as well as improves chances of 
obtaining credit. Moreover, the FCIP (although subsidized) 
is more efficient than free disaster relief payments. 
On the other hand, FCI suffers from several problems. 
Some of them are common to any insurance program, namely, 
adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection is a 
result of imperfect information and occurs when a farmer 
buying insurance has more complete knowledge about the proba-
bility of crop loss than does an insurer. The result of 
adverse selection are excessive premiums for farmers whose 
loss probabilities are lower than those of the rest of farm-
ing population. Lower risk farmers may choose not to partic-
ipate in the program. As a consequence, the insurance pro-
gram will experience e ver increasing losse s as the pool of 
insured farmers becomes riskier. Moral hazard, on the other 
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hand, refers to the risk that a farmer will change his normal 
farm practices after a crop has been insured so as to in-
crease his chances of collecting an indemnity. 
In addition to these two problems, the FCIP has been 
widely criticized for low participation rates despite the 
fact that premiums are subsidized by the government. Accord-
ing to Williams et al. (1993), a participation rate of 50% is 
necessary to make the FCIP actuarially sound and profitable. 
This rate has not been achieved. Participation rates are not 
uniform in all areas, however. In 1992 for example, partici-
pation was highest in North Dakota and lowest in Nevada 
(Table 1.1). 
Participation rates also vary widely among crops (Har-
wood et al., 1991). They are high for crops with erratic 
yields where that crop is primary crop of the area. For 
example, barley and wheat, in semi-arid regions of the 
Plains, tend to have high participation rates. The same 
holds for specialty crops such as raisins that are vulnerable 
to unfavorable weather during critical times of growing 
season. 
In addition to low participation, the FCIP is criticized 
for its high administrative costs, vulnerability to cata-
strophic losses as well as to political support of disaster 
relief programs. 
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Table 1.1 Federal Crop Insurance participation rates in 1992 
state 
Alabama 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Florida 
Georgia 
Idaho 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
Missouri 
Montana 
cropland 
insured 
11.0 
2.7 
8.6 
5.3 
9.5 
0.2 
9 .2 
4 .1 
15.9 
6.3 
23.4 
16.6 
35.0 
22.7 
3.4 
16.2 
0.3 
6.9 
1.1 
6.6 
34.1 
8.7 
7 .7 
28.5 
State 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
New York 
North Carolina 
North Dakota 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 
South Dakota 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Utah 
Vermont 
Virginia 
Washington 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming 
Source: National Crop Insurance Services 
Cropland 
insured 
25.2 
0.1 
1. 3 
8.4 
0.5 
9.9 
44.1 
10.6 
12.4 
8.3 
3.0 
0.5 
6.3 
23.4 
2.1 
19.6 
3.6 
0.3 
6.7 
15 .6 
1. 6 
5.6 
7.6 
All of the above diff iculties contribute to high loss 
ratios of the FCIP. The loss ratio is the ratio of total 
indemnities actually paid (total losses) to total premiums 
charged during a specific time period, usually one year. The 
loss ratio is commonly expressed in percentage terms, in 
other words, multiplied by 100 . During the 1981-1992 period, 
the FCIP experienced an aggregate loss ratio of 143. In 
contrast, the aggregate loss ratio was 64 for private crop-
hail insurance companies. Although the aggregate loss ratio 
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of the FCIP exceeded one, considerable differences between 
crops and states existed. Glauber et al. (1993) showed that 
during the SO's a substantial portion of FCIP losses was 
concentrated in certain parts of the U.S . and was associated 
with the small number of crops. In particular, most of FCIP 
losses were attributable to wheat losses in Montana, soybean 
losses in the Delta States and the Southeast, and grain 
sorghum and cotton losses in the Texas High Plains. Table 
1.2 presents some additional information on FCIP performance 
in comparison with private crop-hail insurance. 
As a result of the ongoing losses e xperienced by the 
FCIC, widespread premium changes were adopted in 1990 with 
the aim of improving the actuarial performance of the pro-
gram. Premium rates were increased for most of the counties 
and crops although some areas enjoyed rate decreases . 
Several other program changes were also introduced in 1990. 
These included a twenty percent limit on year-to-year rate 
increases, target rates for selected crops and states, and a 
non-standard classification system to identify high-risk 
producers with abnormal loss histories. Although the overall 
performance of the FCIP after these adjustments has yet to be 
evaluated, the aggregate FCI loss ratio of 121 for year 1992 
suggests that the shortcomings of the program have not been 
resolved. In 1993, the FCIP faces enormous difficulties due 
to summer-long floods in the Midwest as well as dry weather 
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Table 1.2 The performance of the Federal Crop Insurance 
Program and private crop-hail insurance 
All states, 
all crops 
Liabilityc 
Premiumc 
Lossesc 
Loss ratiod 
Average ratee 
Loss cost' 
Iowa, 
all crops 
Liabilityc 
Premiumc 
Lossesc 
Loss ratiod 
Average ratee 
Loss cost' 
Crop-hail 
insurance• 
185,017,000 
7,009,665 
4,542 ,529 
65 
3.79 
2.45 
21,670,321 
664,173 
437,992 
66 
3.06 
2.02 
a cumulative from 1948 to 1992 
Federal Crop 
Insuranceb 
62,253,724 
3,883,816 
5,539,764 
143 
6.24 
8.90 
10,929,215 
462,457 
375,013 
81 
4.23 
3.43 
b cumulative from 1981 to 1992, excluding 1991 
c thousands of dollars 
d (losses / premiums) x 100 
e dollars per acre 
r (losses / liabilities) x 100 
Source: National Crop Insurance Services 
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in the East. In the state of Iowa, all 99 counties have been 
declared a disaster area and crop and hay losses are 
estimated at 1.37 billion dollars (CARD). 
Various solutions for the current problems of Federal 
Crop Insurance have been suggested. These range from free 
crop insurance on one hand and mandatory crop insurance on 
the other hand. The solution suggested probably most often 
is to base insurance on area rather than individual crop 
yield data (Barnaby and Skees, 1990; Carriker et al., 1990 
and 1991; Miranda, 1991; Glauber et al., 1993). Others who 
researched the FCIP performance recommend using premiums 
reflecting relative risk of farmers (Goodwin, 1993) or using 
yield distribution functions with more flexible 
representation of skeweness (Nelson, 1990). Still others 
call for information collection and contract design 
improvements (Vandeveer, 1990). Perhaps the most fundamental 
change, a shift from target price to target revenue programs, 
was proposed by Mayer (1991). These changes attempt to 
reduce adverse selection and moral hazard problems, and, in 
some cases, also administrative costs, in order to improve 
the actuarial performance of the FCIP and increase the demand 
for this type of insurance. 
Some of the proposed changes in the FCIP design may also 
help increase program participation rates. However, even 
actuarially fair premiums may not assure that every farmer 
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will buy FCI. As is discussed in the next chapter, there are 
factors other than the FCI premiums that influence farmers' 
decision to participate in the program. This study tries to 
identify those factors and their impact on the use of FCI. 
Organization of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 outlines the concepts of decision-making 
process under risk and uncertainty and risk balancing that 
lead to the formulation of the thesis objective . Previous 
empirical studies of the FCIP and their conclusions are 
discussed in Chapter 3. The next chapter presents discrete 
choice models, a logit model in particular, as well as the 
ways to estimate model parameters and to evaluate model fit. 
The sample is described in Chapter 5 along with the def ini-
tions of dependent and explanatory variables as well as 
models tested . Chapter 6 presents the results of empirical 
analysis of FCI participation. Findings and a need for 
further research are discussed in Chapter 7 followed by the 
list of cited references. Finally, the sample questionnaires 
are included in the Appendix. 
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2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The chapter begins with a review of risk management in 
agriculture. It describes typical sources of risk and 
discusses possible ways of dealing with those risks. Atten-
tion then turns to the economic models of decision-making 
under the conditions of risk and uncertainty. Then, the 
concept of risk balancing is discussed. The chapter con-
cludes with the problem statement and the formulation of the 
objective of the study . 
Risk Management in Agricultural Production 
Since all decision making in agricultural production is 
subject to risk and uncertainty, farm management can be 
viewed from a risk management perspective. Crop insurance is 
one of the several ways farmers can manage agricultural risk. 
It should, therefore, be viewed in the overall context of 
risk management and risk balancing. 
Various types of risk influence agricultural production. 
These include production (technical), market (price), techno-
logical, legal, and social risks, as well as human sources of 
risk. Production or technical risk results from random 
variability of agricultural production processes. Yield risk 
is one example of production risk. Market or price risk is 
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due to variations in market prices of both inputs and out-
puts. Technological risk stems from the fact that future 
technological developments may negatively effect outcomes of 
farmers' decisions. Changes in legal and social environment 
constitute another group of risks. Human factors of produc-
tion and management represent the last group of risks. All 
of the above are commonly ref erred to as business risk which 
is exogenous to a farm operation . According to Gabriel and 
Baker {1980), business risk BR is defined as the total vari-
ability, or the coefficient of variation, of net operating 
income in the absence of debt financing 
(J 
BR= E(x) 
where a is the standard deviation of the expected net oper-
ating income E(x). 
A second class of risks is associated with the financial 
structure of individual farm operations . Financial risk 
entails both liquidity and solvency risks. Liquidity risk 
represents the risk that cash generated from a farming 
operation will not be enough to cover current obligations. 
Solvency risk refers to risk that the value of total assets 
will not be sufficient to repay all the debt, had a farmer 
decided to sell his farm business. Financial risk is 
commonly defined as an increase in the variability of income 
stream due to fixed obligations resulting from debt 
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financing. Gabriel and Baker have shown that financial risk 
FR can be written as 
a I 
FR= E(x) E(x) - I 
where I represents fixed debt servicing obligations and a 
and E(x) are defined in the same way as in case of business 
risk. 
Risk management tactics can be split into several cate-
gories. First, production responses to risk include enter-
prise and region selection, diversification, geographic 
dispersion of cropland, technical practices, supplemental 
irrigation, and substituting capital inputs for labor. 
Market or price risk can be managed through numerous 
marketing risk transfer tools, such as selecting enterprises 
with low expected price variability, maintaining eligibility 
for government programs, inventory management, forward con-
tracting and hedging, investing in market information and 
learning, spreading sales over time, and contracting to 
purchase inputs. 
The farm business can also adjust its financial response 
to risk. Examples include maintaining additional liquidity 
with a structure of savings account or credit reserve, leas-
ing assets, or using insurance. Presumably more efficient 
than using each of the above separately is using two or more 
of them as a part of an integrated strategy. 
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Another way of looking at the set of available risk 
responses is to consider whether they directly reduce the 
amount of risk involved in farming or whether they increase 
chances of the farm business to survive unfavorable circum-
stances (Jolly, 1983) . The first strategy, managing risk 
exposure would, for example, include enterprise selection, 
marketing, government programs, and insurance. The second 
category, controlling risk impacts, involves the level of 
financial leverage, organization of business, liquidity, and 
efficiency. 
Clearly, agricultural producers face various types of 
risk and have available many strategies to deal with those 
risks. Crop insurance is an alternative for crop growers 
that can be very useful , probably even more useful when used 
hand in hand with other risk management strategies. 
Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty 
As already mentioned, most decisions in a farming opera-
tion are subject to risk and uncertainty. Risk is a situa-
tion where the outcome of a decision is not known, but the 
probabilities of the occurrence of all possible outcomes are 
known (or at least knowable) . These probabilities can be 
either objective, based on historical experience, or subjec-
tive, reflecting an individual's perception of chances that 
an event will occur (Knight,1921). 
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Uncertainty, on the other hand, is said to exist when 
it is not obvious that probabilities can be meaningfully 
defined, and, thus, empirically measured (Heady, 1952). In 
this later case, any estimate of probability would be entire-
ly subjective ~ In practice, then, the distinction between 
risk and uncertainty diminishes since even objective proba-
bilities are being used subjectively by a decision-maker. 
Therefore, the terms risk and uncertainty are used inter-
changeably. 
Economists have developed a number of models describing 
decision making under uncertainty. Some of the more common 
are (1) decision rules employing no information on probabil-
ities, (2) safety-first rules (lexicographic utility), and 
(3) expected utility maximization (Young,1984). The classi-
cal economic assumption (and the one maintained throughout 
this thesis) is that of the expected utility maximization. 
The expected utility E(U) associated with a discrete 
outcomes can be represented by a weighted sum of all possible 
outcomes Ai (expressed in terms of income, net returns, 
wealth, etc.) where the weights are respective probabilities 
of individual outcomes P(~) 
Taking expectation of the Taylor series expansion of the 
utility function about mean, the expected utility can be 
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expressed in terms of moments of the probability distribution 
of the outcomes 
E(U) =f(µ,a2 ,M3,M4, •• • ) 
Although the vector of all moments represents business 
risk, usually only first two moments (mean and variance) are 
considered in the expected utility function 
E(U) =f {µ, o 2 ) 
This is equivalent to the assumption of quadratic utility 
function. Factors on which the expected utility depends can 
then be interpreted as the expected net returns and the 
variance of the expected net returns. 
The expected utility model provides a framework within 
which farmers' decisions can be evaluated. These decisions 
include enterprise and location selection, whether and what 
kind of rental arrangements to use, financial structure, 
participation in government programs, insurance purchases, 
the use of forward pricing tools, and many others. 
Consider first the decision to buy crop insurance. 
According to the expected utility model, farmer's expected 
utility can be expressed as the weighted sum of his utility 
if a crop shortfall occurs UL and his utility in case of no 
crop loss UN 
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where PL is the probability that the crop shortfall occurs 
and PN is the probability that no crop loss occurs. Insur-
ance, in essence, gives a farmer an opportunity to achieve 
more even distribution of income and consumption over all 
possible states of nature (Ray, 1981). By giving up a small 
portion of income, paying the insurance premiums, the farmer 
reduces the likelihood and magnitude of a possible loss. 
Using the assumption of the expected utility maximiza-
tion the insurance decision can be examined in the familiar 
framework of a budget constraint and preferences. Figure 2.1 
illustrates farmer's choice regarding crop insurance. The 
budget constraint for fair insurance B1 is represented by a 
fair-odds line along which the expected monetary gain is 
zero. Insurance premiums are considered actuarially fair 
when the premium equals the probability of loss PL, adminis-
trative costs are zero, and the insurance industry is compet-
itive. In this special case, one can assert that a risk 
averse farmer will buy full insurance coverage e•. In real 
life, however, this situation rarely occurs. If the FCI 
premium rates are perceived by farmers to be set improperly, 
in other words if the premiums do not reflect each individual 
farmer's chances of crop failure, the farmer faces the budget 
constraint represented by B2 • In such case, even a risk 
averse individual will buy less than full insurance eb, 
paying the amount equal to a-cbN in insurance premiums. 
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The degree of farmer's risk aversion, in other words the 
shape of his indifference curves U, has to be known in order 
to determine the amount of insurance contracted for by each 
farmer. 
For Federal Crop Insurance, an additional choice is the 
one of a deductible. The deductible, or the coverage level, 
acts as co-insurance and reduces premiums charged. A deduct-
ible means that small losses are borne by the individual and 
large losses by the insurer. Deductibles reduce transaction 
costs as well as expected indemnities, therefore, they reduce 
the premiums. As mentioned earlier, four coverage levels are 
available under the current FCI program. 
A similar model can be used to examine other decisions 
that farmers face such as the use of marketing tools. Insur-
ance and forward pricing deal with different kinds of risk. 
Insurance controls yield risk while forward pricing controls 
price risk. When using hedging with futures markets or 
forward contracts, a small premium enables a farmer to get 
rid off unwanted risk. He protects himself from substantial 
losses due to unfavorable price developments, but, at the 
same time, looses an opportunity for above-average gains. 
This is illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
Still another decision is the one of financial structure 
of a farm. Debt financing results in greater total variabil-
ity of income stream. Financial risk stems from the fact 
Ill 
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Figure 2.2 Risk - return trade-off with output hedging 
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that a farmer takes on fixed obligations (interest and 
principal payments). In a short-term, it creates a risk that 
cash flows generated by farm operation will not be sufficient 
to cover debt payments which are due. In a long-run, the 
value of debt can exceed the value of total assets (due to a 
decline in asset values), thus, causing financial 
difficulties. 
The farm financing decision, however, is not independent 
of other farm related decisions. In other words, it is made 
simultaneously with the many production and marketing deci-
sions so as to maintain a balance between total risk exposure 
and net returns . 
Risk Balancing 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, total farm risk 
consists of business risk and financial risk. In other 
words, total risk encompasses the variability of income 
stream in case of no debt financing, business risk, as well 
as an increase of the variability of income stream due to 
fixed debt servicing obligations, financial risk. 
Gabriel and Baker (1980) show that risk balancing repre-
sents the adjustment of business and financial risks as a 
response to an exogenous shock altering the existing balance 
between these two components of total risk . A total risk 
constraint, under the assumptions that no leverage-induced 
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changes in business risk occur and the maximum risk tolerance 
level p can be identified by the decision maker, can be 
written 
a E (x} ~ P 
E (x } E (x} - I 
where a is the standard deviation of the expected net oper-
ating income E(x) and I is the fixed debt servicing obliga-
tion. The first element on the left-hand side of the above 
equation represents business risk and the second term can be 
interpreted as a financial risk multiplier . Hence, Gabriel 
and Baker have demonstrated that as a result of a decrease in 
business risk, financial risk should increase in order to 
maximally exploit the farm's total risk tolerance. Or equiv-
alently, financial risk should decline had business risk 
increased. Collins (1985) have derived the same result using 
the framework of the expected utility maximization. 
The implication of the above discussion is that the 
knowledge of the existing trade-off between business risk and 
financial risk should be used as one of the risk management 
tools in order to maximally exploit total risk tolerance of a 
farm business. In addition, consideration of financing 
decisions should not be omi tted when modeling farm business 
risk decisions (Collins, 1985). 
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Problem statement and Thesis Objective 
Federal Crop Insurance (FCI) has been widely criticized 
for low participation rates and high administrative costs. 
In order to identify causes of low FCI participation, it is 
necessary to understand an individual farmer's choice to 
participate in the FCIP. It has been frequently argued that 
actaurially unfair premiums and the availability of the 
government disaster payments have a negative impact on 
farmers' participation in FCI. However, the FCI 
participation rates are lower than expected even in areas 
where the FCI premiums seem to be actuarially sound. This 
suggests the existence of forces beyond the FCI premiums and 
the government disaster programs affecting farmers' decision 
to participate in FCI. This study attempts to identify such 
factors and their impact on FCI use. Risk balancing offers a 
possible explanation of low FCI participation in that higher 
levels of business risk are allowed by lower financial risk. 
In addition to the trade-off between business and financial 
risk, the impact of human capital resources, the use of risk 
management strategies, as well as farm risk bearing capacity 
on the probability of FCI participation is investigated. 
Farmers' decision to buy FCI is analyzed using the 
expected utility maximization framework. Although the ex-
pected utility is not evaluated explicitly, it is treated as 
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a driving force for a discrete choice farmers make with 
respect to FCI purchases. 
The results of the thesis may serve in predicting the 
probability of FCI being purchased by farmers in Iowa under 
various circumstances. 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reviews several empirical studies of crop 
insurance, Federal Crop Insurance in particular. The litera-
ture review is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather illus-
trative of the various aspects of the Federal Crop Insurance 
Program (FCIP). The second part of the chapter focuses on 
studies analyzing farmers' socioeconomic characteristics and 
their impact on the decision to participate in the FCIP. The 
chapter concludes with the outline of issues that need fur-
ther consideration. 
crop Insurance Issues and studies 
Many economic researc hers hav e analyzed the use of crop 
insurance and its use in combination with other risk manage-
ment instruments. The most widely addressed topics related 
to crop insurance are (1) risk attitudes and risk reducing 
tools used by farmers, (2) the farm-level impact of partici-
pation in the Federal Crop Insurance Program, (3) lenders' 
responses to and influence on farmers' decisions to buy crop 
insurance, (4) crop insurance demand estimation, and finally 
(5) relationships between the use of FCI and the socioeco-
nomic characteristics of farm operators. 
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Different risk strategies used by farmers 
Studies of Miller and Trock (1979), King and Oamek 
(1983), Falatoonzadeh et al. (1985), Boggess et al. (1985), 
Wisner and Jolly (1985), Nichols (1985), Walker and Jodha 
(1986), and Edelman et al. (1990) have reached rather unani-
mous conclusions. They demonstrated that farmers would 
benefit from the simultaneous use of several risk management 
strategies. For example, they propose various combinations 
of risk reducing practices 
crop diversification, participation in futures markets, 
and the use of the FCIP; 
- production management strategies and hedging; or 
- the use of futures markets, cash forward contracts, and 
options. 
The most recent studies place greater emphasis on the use of 
marketing alternatives such as forward contracting, futures, 
and options in conjunction with FCI. 
The farm-level impact of the use of Federal Crop Insurance 
A number of researchers have analyzed impacts of pur-
chasing FCI on farm income stream. Most of the studies 
relied on simulation techniques applied to a representative 
farm. However, the authors' findings are not uniform. One 
group of studies indicates that FCI can be an attractive 
alternative for farmers since it decreases farm income 
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variability (Leatham et al., 1987), may result in higher 
average net after-tax income (Lemieux et al., 1982) and fewer 
years of negative income (Barber and Thair, 1950). It also 
reduces the need for borrowing and enhances the possibility 
of obtaining credit (Rodewald, 1960) . 
On the other hand, others argue that the use of crop 
insurance, FCI in particular, may not reduce farm income 
variability (Lee and Djogo, 1984; Mapp and Jeter, 1988) . In 
one study, FCIP participation was shown to reduce the proba-
bility of survival of a high-debt hog farm when yield vari-
ability was equal to county level values (Patrick and Rao, 
1989) . 
Lenders' response to insurance used by farmers 
Lee and Djogo (1984), Binswanger (1986), Pfleuger and 
Barry (1986, 1988), Leatham et al . (1987, 1988), and Hughes 
(1990) agree that the use of crop insurance is a desirable 
risk management strategy from the lenders' point of view . 
These studies show that lenders, on aggregate, would extend 
more credit and/or offer lower rates to those farmers who 
used crop insurance . In fact, they may even require that 
farmers purchase crop insurance in order to obtain credit. 
Lenders recognize FCI to be effective in reducing loan loss-
es. Further, FCI may facilitate credit extension to farmers 
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who were previously unable to qualify because of unacceptable 
default risk. 
Pfleuger and Schmiesing (1987) indicate that suppliers 
of agricultural credit may not feel that crop insurance is a 
viable alternative for financially strong farms. Also, 
lenders believe that farmers are more apt to purchase hail/-
fire insurance rather than multiple peril crop insurance and 
that they are sensitive to the cost of the latter. 
Although lenders could exert significant influence on 
farmers' decisions regarding the use of crop insurance, the 
problem seems to be in poor communication between the two 
groups. All of the above suggests that a major source of 
crop insurance may in fact come from financial systems rather 
than from farmers themselves (Knight et al . ,1989). 
Demand for multiple peril crop insurance in the United States 
Gardner and Kramer (1986), Hojjati (1986), Vandeveer 
(1990) and others show that higher premiums, lower expected 
indemnity and lower expected profit result in lower FCI 
participation rates. Farmers' risk aversion also plays 
important role in the decision regarding crop insurance 
purchases. Stronger risk aversion as well as higher vari-
ability of profit increase demand for multiple peril crop 
insurance. 
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In addition, Niewuwoudt and Bullock (1986) find crop 
specialization, part ownership, the possibility of disaster 
payments, and farm size to be significant factors effecting 
the demand for FCI. Goodwin (1993) shows that previous-year 
yields, land values, and the percentage of corporations in a 
county influence FCI demand. In addition, he demonstrates 
that the elasticity of crop insurance demand differs for low-
risk and high-risk producers. He, thus, confirms Miranda's 
conclusion (1991) that a more adversely-selected pool of 
insurance buyers, the pool with higher loss-risk, has lower 
demand elasticity . This has important implications for the 
FCIP in that undifferentiated rate i n c reases would exacerbate 
the already existing adverse selection problem. 
Characteristics of the FCIP participants 
Authors of the early studies on participants and nonpar-
ticipants of FCI found interesting and rather consistent 
results about characteristics of the two groups of farmers. 
Clendenin (1942), as a part of his evaluation study of early 
stages of the FCIP operation , considered the characteristics 
of individuals who insured their crops. He surveyed wheat 
producers in 8 counties of 6 states and found that smaller 
farms, financially weak farms, and less-diversified (wheat-
specialized) farms had more incentive to buy insurance . 
Also, the results of the study revealed that tenants were 
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slightly more likely to insure than owner-operators and non-
f arming landlords. 
In another study, Jones and Larson (1965) evaluated the 
economic impact of FCI on farmers and other businesses relat-
ed to agriculture. They interviewed farmers in 4 counties of 
Virginia and Montana and found that insured farmers, as a 
group, had less financial holdings, more and larger debts, 
were more specialized (in tobacco in Virginia, and wheat and 
barley in Montana) , had less irrigation (the case of 
Virginia), generated lower total income, and were slightly 
older than uninsured farmers. The only farm characteristic 
for which the study revealed different results for the two 
states was farm size: in Virginia, smaller farms used more 
insurance, while in Montana, larger farms were slightly more 
insured. 
Loftsgard (1967) summarized the results of a survey on 
characteristics of crop insurance participants and nonpartic-
ipants from six Great Plains states and noted that the only 
consistency observed was that participants were slightly 
older and relied more heavily on cash-grain income than 
nonparticipants. In similar study in North Dakota, Delvo and 
Loftsgard (1967) found that participants in the FCIP operated 
the largest farms in low- and medium-risk areas, while just 
the opposite was true for high-ri sk crop areas. Average crop 
yields were about the same for both groups. 
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Shipley {1967) examined demographic and other character-
istics of participants, prior-participants, and nonparticipa-
nts in the FCIP in Northwestern Texas as a part of his study 
on the role and current trends of the FCIP. The results 
suggested no significant difference existed between the 
groups in age, education, number of dependents, experience, 
yields, or variable costs of production. However, there were 
significant differences in farm size as measured by cropland 
acres (the bigger the farm, the lower the insurance cover-
age), in expected total net farm income (again, negative 
relationship), and in contracted annual liabilities (showing 
the positive relationship with the use of crop insurance). 
More recent studies employed either linear (Beeson, 
1971) or logistic (Boggess et al., 1985; Knight et al., 1989; 
Olsen, 1990; and Khojasteh, 1992) models of regression analy-
sis to test the significance of relationships between farm 
and farmer characteristics and the use of FCI. All of these 
studies were cross-sectional. The data were obtained by 
mailed surveys or personal interviews with randomly selected 
respondents. The number of respondents varied from 48 (Bogg-
ess et al.) to 920 (Knight et al.). 
A qualitative dependent variable was employed in all of 
these studies. Beeson compared four calculated indexes of 
insurance management effectiveness for two data samples. One 
sample consisted of FCI participants, the other of nonpartic-
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ipants. Boggess et al. analyzed 21 binary (O,l) dependent 
variables indicating the use of different risk management 
strategies including the use of all-risk crop insurance and 
hail insurance. Knight et al. tested three models with (0,1) 
dependent variables defined as the use of multiple-peril crop 
insurance, crop hail and fire insurance, and forward con-
tracting, respectively. Olsen combined two binary variables 
into one qualitative variable with four categories (0,1,2,3) 
to account for all possible combinations of the use of multi-
ple peril crop insurance and private hail/fire insurance. 
Finally, Khojasteh also specified a binary variable indicat-
ing participation and non-participation in FCI and used it in 
three regression models: linear, logit, and probit. 
Table 3.1 summarizes all independent variables used by 
these authors. It also indicates whether the variable re-
vealed significant relationship with a dependent variable 
defined in a particular study, and, if so, the sign of an 
estimated regression parameter is shown as well. 
The characteristics analyzed most often were farmers' 
age and education, farm size measured by gross farm sales, 
farm enterprise mix, the debt versus equity structure of a 
farm, and acres owned versus rented. Variables measuring in 
some way financial performance or condition of farms were not 
used systematically . Boggess et al. relate the use of crop 
insurance to variables such as long-term and short-term 
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Table 3.1 Explanatory variables used in the selected crop 
insurance studies 
Variable 
Age 
Education 
Experience 
Residence/Region 
Acres irrigated (%) 
Acres rented/acres owned 
Farm size (acres operated) 
Gross sales 
Gross sales * age 
Major crop dummy 
1 
Tobacco sales ($) NS 
Tobacco sales (% of total) (+) 
Livestock sales ($) NS 
Livestock sales (% of total) (-) 
crop sales (% of total) 
Cattle sales (% of total) 
Hog sales (% of total) 
Total farm income (-) 
Off-farm income/work 
Physical assets ($) (-) 
Debt to asset ratio 
Equity to asset ratio 
Net worth ($) 
Long-term credit (-) 
Short-term credit capacity NS 
Liquid fin. reserves NS 
ROA 
Financial stress dummy 
Models of: 1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Beeson, 1971 
Knight et al., 1989 
Olsen, 1990 
Khojasteh, 1992 
NS - variable not significant 
2 
NS 
(-) 
NS 
NS 
NS 
(+) 
NS 
NS 
(-) 
3 
NS 
(+) 
NS 
( +) 
NS 
NS 
(+) 
NS 
NS 
4 
(-) 
x 
x 
NS 
( +) 
(-) 
(+) 
x 
x 
x 
(-) 
(+) 
x 
(+) - significant variable positively associated with the 
use of Federal Crop Insurance 
(-) - significant variable negatively associated with the 
use of Federal Crop Insurance 
x - variable first used, but not significant, 
therefore later omitted from the final model 
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Table 3.1 (continued) 
Total insurance budget NS 
Fire ins.(% of total budget) NS 
Automobile ins. (% of total) NS 
Crop ins.(% of total) NS 
Crop contracted (%) 
Use of other forward tools 
NS 
NS NS 
credit capacity, total value of physical assets, and liquid 
financial reserves. Olsen and Khojasteh used return on assets 
and a dummy variable for financially stressed farms. As to 
the results, Beeson found that total farm income and total 
assets were significantly higher among those who did not 
purchase Federal crop Insurance. Participants obtained a 
higher percentage of income from tobacco, while non-partici-
pants obtained a higher percentage from livestock . Surpris-
ingly, non-participants had a significantly larger amount of 
debt. 
Although Boggess et al. presented some interesting 
results with regard to the use of certain risk management 
practices, they were unable to give any satisfactory explana-
tion for the use of crop insurance. All independent vari-
ables used in their model showed insignificant relationships 
with the use of both all-risk crop insurance and hail insur-
ance . A possible explanation for this result can be found 
by looking at their sample. It was rather small, including 
only 48 responses of farmers in Alabama and Florida (only one 
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county in each state). Also, the study covered only the use 
of risk management practices for a specific year. 
Knight et al. concluded that Texas farmers with higher 
gross sales, less equity, and lower education use Federal 
Crop Insurance more frequently. 
Olsen's insurance model results indicated that farmers 
who derived a greater percentage of their income from crops, 
those who rented a greater proportion of total acreage oper-
ated, and those with higher debt-to-asset ratios were more 
likely to buy crop insurance coverage . All these relation-
ships were as hypothesized. 
The results of the three model s (linear, logit, and 
probit) tested by Khojasteh showed that younger farmers, 
farmers with less equity, higher return on assets (after 
taxes), and bigger farms (measured by acres operated) were 
more inclined to purchase FCI. However, farm size as mea-
sured by gross sales, rather than acres operated, seemed to 
reduce the FCI participation. In addition, he found that 
farmers who pref er decoupling of current government income 
support programs, those who received disaster payments in 
1988, and those operating in Southern Iowa were more likely 
to participate in the FCIP. 
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Unresolved Issues 
Clearly, several factors were found to play an important 
role in explaining farmers' decision to participate in the 
FCIP . Among those are farm diversification, tenancy, and the 
financial structure of a farm . Farmers who rely more heavily 
on sales from crops, rent greater proportion of land they 
operate, and have higher debt levels and less equity are more 
likely to participate in the FCIP . These conclusions are 
rather consistent among the studies discussed above. 
However, different conclusions were reached regarding 
farm size. Earlier studies indicated h i gher probability of 
FCI participation for smaller farms, whereas more recent 
analyses suggested just the opposite. 
Moreover, several variables expected to be relevant in 
the FCI decision did not confirm the hypothesis. Human 
capital variables such as age, education, and experience were 
mostly insignificant . Although they may not affect the 
insurance decision directly, demographic characteristics can 
have a substantial indirect effect on this decision. Differ-
ences in age, experience, and education are usually reflected 
in farm size, debt levels, the degree of risk aversion, and 
familiarity with forward pricing tools, hedging and options 
in particular . 
More attention should also be paid to other risk manage-
ment strategies such as hail insurance, participation in 
38 
government programs, rental arrangements, and forward pricing 
tools. The analysis of forward pricing tools such as forward 
contracting, hedging, and commodity options did not yield, 
contrary to expectations, significant results. The relevance 
of other risk management tools to the FCI participation 
decision has not yet been investigated . 
Finally, the impact of the risk bearing capacity of a 
farm on the decision to buy FCI has not been addressed suff i-
ciently. Higher solvency, liquidity, and efficiency improve 
the farm's chances for survival in case of crop f ailure since 
they increase the farm's ability to bear losses. 
Based on previous studies and the conceptual model 
presented in Chapter 2, the decision to participate in FCI 
can be expressed as 
U= f (X1 , X2 , X3 , X4 , X 5 IXN) 
where U is farmer's utility derived from using FCI, X1 is a 
vector of demographic characteristics, X2 is a vector of farm 
characteristics, X3 represents business risk, X4 represents 
financial structure of a farm, X5 indicates the location of a 
farm, and finally XN is a vector of given variables such as 
the FCI design attri butes . 
De mographic and farm characteris t i cs directly or indi-
rectly d e termi ne the amount of risk involved in a f arm opera-
tion. Risk management tools such as hail insurance, govern-
ment programs, crop share leases, and forward pricing tools 
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are used to manage different types of risk commonly referred 
to as business risk. Farm financial structure influences the 
level of farm financial risk. According to the risk balanc-
ing concept, business and financial risk are adjusted, fol-
lowing an exogenous shock to the existing balance, so as to 
maximally exploit total farm risk tolerance. Finally, farm 
location may reflect differences in soil conditions, weather 
patterns, or enterprise mix in different areas. 
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4. DISCRETE CHOICE MODELS 
This chapter reviews the theoretical basis for the 
econometric analysis described in the subsequent chapters. 
First, discrete choice models and their derivation from the 
utility maximization concept are discussed. Then, a descrip-
tion of the multinomial ordered logit model follows. Estima-
tion methods for the model as well as ways its results should 
be interpreted conclude the chapter. 
Discrete Choice Models and Utility Maximization 
Qualitative response models, also known as discrete 
choice, categorical, or quantal models, are models in which 
dependent variables are discrete rather than continuous in 
nature. Economists and biometricians have widely used QR 
models since they can capture the qualitative nature of many 
of problems with which these sciences deal. Binomial models, 
models with one exogenous variable taking two discrete val-
ues, are used most often, especially in bio-assay. Economics 
uses binomial models as well as more complex models, such as 
multinomial and multivariate. 
Several authors (McFadden, 1974,1981; Amemiya, 1985) 
have shown the linkage betwee n the usual economic assumption 
of utility maximization and discrete choice models. McFadden 
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(1974) was the first who derived this type of a model from 
the random utility concept. He showed and proved, using the 
axioms of independence of irrelevant alternatives, positivi-
ty, and irrelevance of alternative set effects, the deriva-
tion of the conditional logit model (CLM) from a utility 
maximization model. He showed the same for the multinomial 
logit model (MLM) and noted that they are algebraically 
equivalent, making appropriate substitutions. However, the 
economic interpretation of the two models differs. The MLM 
considers only effects of characteristics of an individual 
making a choice. The CLM, on the other hand, includes the 
vector of attributes of available alternatives along with the 
individual choice-maker's characteristics (Maddala, 1983). 
Due to different specification and analysis, it is 
necessary to distinguish between models with ordered and 
unordered categorical vari ables. Using an ordered model when 
the true one is unordered leads to biases in the estimation 
of the probabilities. Using an unordered model when the 
actual model is ordered leads to the loss of efficiency 
rather than consistency (Maddala, 1983). Here, the attention 
is limited to ordered specifications since the dependent 
variable used in the analysis is ordered. 
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The Multinomial Loqit Model 
The multinomial logit model (MLM) is, in a sense, a 
simpler specification of the two models mentioned above. 
Assuming that a utility maximizing economic individual has a 
vector of measured attributes z 1 , and faces a set of ordered 
alternatives indexed j, where j=l, ... ,k+l and k+l>2, one can 
write the i th indi victual' s utility function Ui associated 
with the j ~ alternative in the form 
U1i = P'.r1+ei i 
where P' is the vector of unknown parameters and e1J is a 
stochastic function of random disturbances (i.e., individual 
tastes) . Then, the i th individual will choose the alterna-
tive j only if 
U1i > U1k for all k>1 j 
the utility associated with the alternative j is higher than 
the utilities derived from other available choices. Alterna-
tively, one can write 
u1i =Max ( u11 , u12, ... , uik•l) 
In practice, utility is an unobservable, or latent 
variable . One can only measure some observed variable y 1 
reflecting this underlying latent variable and assume that 
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the i~ individual will choose the jth response category, 
yi=j, if and only if 
for j=l, ... ,k,k+l 
where a 1<a 2< . . . <«k+l partition the real line into successive 
intervals . 
Assume that the error terms in the above utility func-
tion are distributed identically and independently and have 
the Type I extreme value (or log Weibull) cumulative distri-
bution function. Then, for all j's, respective cumulative 
probabilities, i.e., the probabilities that the i ~ individu-
al will choose an ordered response less than or equal to j, 
can be evaluated in the form 
where e is the base of natural logarithm. For the last 
ordered category (j=k+l}, this cumulative probability obvi-
ously equals one . 
Using the cumulative probabilities, the empirical cumu-
lative logits (the odds ratios) can be formed and the 
Taylor expansion (Zellner and Lee, 1965) can be used to show 
that 
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pij Al 1 . . =ln =ex J +., z; 
i; 1-P ~ 
i j 
where 11J 's are the respective cumulative legits for 
j=l, •.• ,k. This function is the inverse of the cumulative 
logistic distribution function F(x) = 1 (with a zero mean 
l+e -X 
1t 2 
and a variance equal to 3 ), hence the name legit (Greene, 
1993). The legit model transforms the problem of predicting 
probabilities within a (0,1) range to the problem of predict-
ing the odds that the event in question will occur within the 
entire real line (Pindyck and Rubinfeld,1981). The curves of 
logistic and normal distributions agree closely, except that 
the former has slightly heavier tails than the later. The 
slope of the logistic distribution function is greatest at 
P=l/2 which implies that the changes in explanatory variables 
influence the probability of an event's occurring rather 
substantially at the midpoint of the distribution. 
Estimation, Interpretation, and Assessing Goodness of fit of 
the Multinomial Logit Model 
Gurland et al. {1960) suggest the estimation of the 
ordered legit model by either (1) minimum chi-square proce-
dure or (2) maximum likelihood method. Both estimation 
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methods yield consistent asymptotically normal efficient 
estimates (Gurland et al.,1960; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981,-
1991). Still another estimation method is weighted least 
squares estimation. However, it results in some loss of 
efficiency (Cox,1970) and requires data to be grouped into 
sets which may be impossible to achieve when many explanatory 
variables are being used. 
Although the minimum chi-square procedure is easier to 
apply, according to many authors maximum likelihood estima-
tion is the most suitable estimation technique for the legit 
model. The estimation depends on (1) the concavity of the 
model likelihood function and on (2) the identifiability of 
the model (McCullagh,1980). Regarding concavity, Mccullagh 
(1980) proves that the log likelihood function of the MLM is 
globally concave. The second problem, identifiability of the 
model, is related to the rank of the design matrix. It can 
be eliminated by the imposition of appropriate constraints or 
by the use of generalized inverse matrices. 
With modern computer technology, maximum likelihood 
estimates are easily computed by Newton-Raphson iterative 
method. However, when estimating ordered models, convergence 
cannot be expected to be as fast as with simpler models 
(Haberman,1974). Non-convergence is a good practical indica-
tor that the model being fitted is not appropriate {Mccull-
agh, 1980). The model can be estimated using the standard-
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ized SAS System, namely, using the LOGIST procedure described 
by Harrell (1983). 
Parameters a; J are frequently referred to as "cut 
points" or "thresholds" on the logistic scale. They must be 
positive and a: 1 <a: 2 < .. . <ax•l (Maddala,1983). In practice, even 
without restrictions specified, maximum likelihood estimation 
yields positive estimates. If not, the model being estimated 
is not correctly specified. 
The vector of regression parameters P is of much more 
interest since it links the log odds to the covariates z 1 • 
The parameters P do not depend on the actual response cate-
gory involved, although, estimates will, in general, be 
affected. 
Using the estimated cumulative legits evaluated at the 
means of the explanatory variables, the probability that the 
ich individual will belong to the jth response category can 
be evaluated in the f ollowing way: 
Prob(y1=jjx 1 ) = F ( a 1+ P
1x 1 ) 
= F(a J+ P1.r1 ) - F(aJ- i +P1z 1 ) 
= 1-F( a k+ P1.r1 ) 
for j=l 
for l<j 5k 
for j=k+l 
The interpretation of the estimated p coefficients of 
the logit model is not straightforward. The coefficients do 
not reflect changes in the explanatory variables on the 
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probability of an event's occurrence directly. Rather, they 
reflect the effect of changes in the independent variables on 
the log odds The effect of those changes on the 
probability depends on the initial values of all explanatory 
variables and their coefficients (i.e., on the initial proba-
bility) . 
A more illustrative way of interpreting the estimated 
P coefficients is to evaluate the marginal effects of chang-
es of independent var i ables on the estimated probabilities 
(Greene, 1993). Thus, for a continuous regression variable 
xm, we write 
for j=l 
for l <j5k 
for j=k+l 
In the case of a discrete explanatory variable, the 
marginal effect is evaluated in the form 
where MEiJ is the marginal effect of the discrete variable 
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on the probability that yi=j and z-1 and z (z-l<z) are the 
respective levels of the discrete variable. 
It is also possible to evaluate confidence limits for 
both the linear predictor of the cumulative probability and 
the predicted cumulative probability. The asymptotic (1-
«)100% confidence interval for the linear predictor f ii is 
where 8(fiJ )=J(1,x7)cov(l,x7) 7 • For the predicted cumulative 
probability Pii ' the asymptotic (1-«)100% confidence interval 
is 
1 1 
Several authors proposed various measures of the good-
ness of fit of logit models (Judge et al.,1985, Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld, 1991). Among the measures they suggest are (1) 
the log likelihood chi-square test 
where twice the difference between the maximum value of the 
log-likelihood of restricted and unrestricted models has an 
asymptotically chi-square distribution with the degrees of 
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freedom equal to the number of restrictions, and (2) the 
likelihood ratio test (a pseudo-R2 test) 
This measure is zero when the model has no value and is one 
when the model is a perfect predictor . 
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5. EMPIRICAL DATA AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter begins with a description of the two data 
samples used in the empirical analysis. Then, the dependent 
variable for the Federal Crop Insurance logistic regression 
is defined. Next, explanatory variables are specified and 
their hypothesized relationships to the use of FCI are 
discussed. Finally, two empirical models tested are 
described. 
study Design and Sample Description 
The data used in the thesis were obtained from the Iowa 
Farm Finance survey (FFS) conducted in 1991 and 1993 . The 
survey was conducted by Iowa state University (Ames, IA) in 
cooperation with Iowa Agricultural Statistics (Des Moines, 
IA) . 1 In both years, questionnaires were mailed to a random 
sample of Iowa farm operators proportionately representing 
all 99 counties of the State of Iowa. In 1991, 881 valid 
responses out of 2,142 mailed questionnaires were obtained. 
In 1993, a new random sample of 3,500 respondents was drawn 
and 1,125 valid responses were obtained. Samples of both 
1The survey was approved by the Iowa State University Human 
Subjects Review Committee. 
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1991 and 1993 survey instruments are included in Appendices A 
and B, respectively . 
Demographic characteristics of the 1991 and 1993 samples 
are shown in Table 5.1 . On average, respondents of 1993 
survey were younger, with fewer years of farming experience, 
and supported more dependents . Also, the average farm size 
was smaller for the 1993 sample . This fact is also reflected 
in lower earnings and expenses, as well as equity of an 
average 1993 farm. Higher average debt levels and lower 
average values of assets resulted in higher debt-to-asset 
ratio for the 1993 sample. 
Table 5.1 Demographic characteristics of the sample Iowa 
farm operators 
Number of Observations 
Characteristic 
Age 
Experience(years) 
Total acres operated 
Dependents 
Dependents under 18 
Gross income($) 
Interest expenses($) 
Total expenditures($) 
Total assets($) 
Total debt($) 
Debt/asset( %) 
January 1, 1991 
881 
57.7 
33.8 
439.9 
2.6 
0.5 
127979.0 
10328.0 
110544.0 
563350.0 
101790.0 
18.1 
January 1, 1993 
1125 
55.4 
30.0 
381. 6 
2 . 7 
0.7 
101547.0 
7994.0 
92797.0 
510846.0 
126440.0 
24 .8 
Source : Iowa Farm Finance Survey, 1991 and 1993 
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Tables 5.2 and 5.3 present financial statements of an 
average survey respondent. The average Balance Sheet (Table 
5.2) suggests that debt and asset structure was very similar 
for the two samples despite the fact that in 1993 average 
asset levels were lower and debt levels were higher than in 
1991. The Income Statement of an average respondent (Table 
5.3) shows consistency with the smaller farm size for the 
second sample in that higher income was derived from off-farm 
activities and lower from farm operation. 
Finally, farm type distributions for both years (Table 
5.4), based on the percentage contri bution of a particular 
enterprise to total farm sales, show mixed grain/livestock 
type as the most frequent type followed by grain farm type . 
Farms specialized in livestock production comprised approxi-
mately one third of the samples. 
In Tables 5.5 and 5.6, the operator's age and farm size 
distributions for the two FFS samples are compared with 1987 
Iowa Census of Agriculture . The sample in 1991 under-repre-
sented farm operators younger than 45 years and over-repre-
sented those older than 55 years. The 1993 age distribution 
followed that of Iowa Ag Census more closely. However, 
farmers under 35 years of age continued to be under-
represented while just the opposite was true for farmers 
older than 65 years. As to the farm size distribution, both 
FFS samples under-represented farms of less than 50 acres. 
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Table 5.2 Average balance sheet (dollars) for the sample 
Iowa farm operators 
January 1, 1991 January 1, 1993 
Number of Observations 881 1125 
ASSETS 
Cash 14165 15040 
Financial Investments 46019 40087 
Crops and Livestock 
Held For Sale 83635 68985 
Machinery, Equipment 
and Breeding Stock 98906 85525 
Land and Buildings 315871 287899 
Other Assets 4754 13310 
Total Assets 563350 510846 
LIABILITIES 
Non Real Estate 
Bank 23664 29593 
Farm Credit System 2182 1566 
FmHA 2576 2284 
Insurance Company 658 489 
Individual 3915 5150 
Merchant/ Dealer 1664 3552 
Other Loans 3454 10888 
Non Real Estate Total 38113 53522 
Real Estate 
Bank 17213 23005 
Farm Credit System 19981 19901 
FmHA 5443 4802 
Insurance Company 5487 2886 
Individual 14498 18245 
Merchant/ Dealer 166 326 
Other Loans 889 3753 
Real Estate Total 63677 72918 
Total Debt 101790 126440 
Net Worth 461560 384406 
Source: Iowa Farm Finance Survey, 1991 and 1993 
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Table 5.3 Average income statement (dollars) 
Iowa farm operators 
Number of Observations 
Gross Income 
+ Net Rental Income 
+ Sale of Breeding 
Stock 
+ Sale of Farm 
Property (excl.land) 
Gross Farm Income 
- Operating Expense 
- Interest Expense 
Net Cash Farm Income 
+ Inventory Change 
Adjusted Net Cash Income 
- Depreciation 
Net Farm Income 
Wages and Salaries 
+ Interest & Dividends 
+ Other Income 
Off-farm Income 
+ Capital Gains 
Accrual Off-farm Income 
Net Income 
Net Cash Income 
na - not available 
1991 
881 
127979 
2136 
2374 
na 
132489 
88692 
10328 
33469 
8752 
42221 
13563 
28658 
8803 
5168 
6543 
20514 
4332 
24846 
53504 
53983 
for 
Source: Iowa Farm Finance Survey, 1991 and 1993 
the sample 
1993 
1125 
101547 
1814 
na 
2370 
105731 
73587 
7994 
24150 
9029 
33179 
10954 
22225 
13851 
3389 
10369 
27609 
2923 
30532 
52757 
51759 
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Table 5.4 The distribution of farm types for the sample 
Iowa farm operators 
Farm type 
Cash grain 
Mixed - grain/livestock 
Hog 
Cattle 
Other, including dairy 
1991 sample 
26.9 
34.2 
13.1 
11.5 
14.3 
1993 sample 
27.3 
33.0 
11.7 
10.9 
17 .1 
Source: Iowa Farm Finance Survey, 1991 and 1993 
Table 5.5 Comparison of age distribution between 1987 Iowa 
Ag Census and the Farm Finance Survey samples 
Iowa Ag Farm Finance Farm Finance 
Age group Census 1987 Survey 1991 Survey 1993 
(%) (%) (%) 
Less than 35 19.3 2.7 4.6 
35-44 20.2 13.4 19.1 
45-54 20.7 19.4 22.1 
55-64 24.0 35 . 8 27.6 
65 up 15.8 28 . 7 26.6 
Average age 49 years 58 years 55 years 
Sources: Iowa Ag Census, 1987; Iowa Farm Finance Survey, 
1991 and 1993 
Table 5.6 Comparison of farm size distribution between 1987 
Iowa Ag Census and the Farm Finance Survey sam 
pl es 
Iowa Ag Farm Finance Farm Finance 
Farm size Census 1987 Survey 1991 Survey 1993 
(acres) (%) (%) (%) 
1-49 18.0 4.2 8.3 
50-179 26.2 16.9 26.7 
180-499 37.1 44.9 39.4 
500-999 15.1 28.4 19.2 
1,000 up 3.6 5.6 6.4 
Average acres 301 acres 440 acres 382 acres 
Sources: Iowa Ag Census, 1987; Iowa Farm Finance Survey, 
1991 and 1993 
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In addition, the 1991 sample consisted of more farms larger 
than 500 acres than was suggested by the Census. 
Dependent variable 
The same dependent variable applies to both 1991 and 
1993 FFS samples. The variable represents the intensity of 
the use of multiple peril crop insurance (Federal Crop 
Insurance) by Iowa farm operators. The survey question 
regarding farmers' participation in Federal Crop Insurance 
(FCI) did not relate to any single year. Instead, the 
intensity of use was measured on a five-point scale ( l=Never, 
5=Always), thus, resulting in an ordered categorical variable 
CROPINS . Table 5.7 shows the distr ibution of the variable 
CROPINS for the two samples along with the mean scores. 
Table 5.7 The intensity of the use of Federal Crop Insurance 
for the FFS samples 
The intensity of use 
1. Never 
2. Seldom 
3 . Half of time 
4. Most of time 
5. Always 
Mean Score 
1991 sample 
31. 2 
9.2 
15.8 
11. 2 
32.6 
3.04 
1993 sample 
34.3 
17.2 
4.3 
12 . 1 
32.1 
2.91 
Source: Iowa Farm Finance Survey, 1991 and 1993 
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Average demographic and financial characteristics of the 
FFS samples as well as farm type distribution by the intensi-
ty of the use of FCI are presented in Tables 5.8 and 5.9. In 
order to simplify the tables, the three middle response 
levels of CROPINS (2, 3, 4) were grouped into one category 
(Sometimes). The data in Table 5.8 (demographic and 
financial characteristics) do not indicate major differences 
within each sample between the three intensity levels of FCI 
use . The only exceptions are total debt level, debt-to-asset 
ratio, and number of farmers with no outstanding farm debt 
for the 1991 sample. Farmers with greater debt obligations 
(both in absolute and relative terms) seem to use FCI more 
often. 
Farm type distributions by the use of FCI (Table 5.9) 
suggest that farms with more than half of total sales coming 
from beef production use FCI less frequently. In addition, 
cash grain and grain/livestock farms indicate more intense 
use of multiple peril crop insurance . 
The ordered discrete variable CROPINS was used to con-
struct the empirical cumulative logits that formed the depen-
dent variable in the logistic regression of the FCI use. 
Models tested are specified in the last section of this 
chapter. Results are presented in Chapter 6 . 
Data obtained in the 1993 survey permitted an alterna-
tive specification of the use of FCI and, thus, testing the 
Table 5.8 Demographic and financial characteristics of the FFS samples by the use of 
·MPCI 
No. of 
observations 
Age 
Acres owned 
Acres operated 
Dependents 
Dependents under 
18 
Experience (years) 
Gross income ($) 
Interest expenses 
($) 
Total expenditure 
($) 
Total assets ($) 
Total debt ($) 
Debt/asset 
Number of farmers 
with no debt 
January 1, 1991 
Never 
274 
61.0 
272 
387 
2 
0 
36.5 
127,998 
9,217 
107,417 
660,642 
78,109 
0.15 
116 
Sometimes 
318 
56.3 
256 
452 
3 
1 
32 . 5 
127,352 
9,317 
114,464 
529,862 
98,725 
0.19 
79 
Always 
284 
57.0 
247 
472 
3 
1 
33.0 
129,601 
12,465 
112., 579 
524,772 
127,207 
0.26 
61 
Source: Iowa Farm Finance Survey, 1991 and 1993 
Never 
347 
55.2 
253 
337 
3 
1 
29.3 
95,956 
7,630 
83,602 
493,015 
122,865 
0.33 
45 
January 1, 1993 
Sometimes 
339 
54.5 
297 
452 
3 
1 
29.5 
108,307 
8,270 
98,574 
521,016 
118,307 
0.30 
43 
Always 
325 
53.6 
226 
408 
3 
1 
29.5 
108,131 
8,959 
98,223 
433,928 
141,092 
0 . 36 
24 
U1 
CX> 
Table 5.9 Farm types for the FFS samples by the use of MPCI 
January 1, 1991 January 1, 1993 
Never Sometimes Always All Never Sometimes Always All 
Farm type (%) 
Cash grain 25 25 31 27 24 27 31 27 
Grain/ livestock 32 35 35 34 26 37 40 33 
Hogs 10 17 12 13 13 12 11 12 
Beef 18 9 8 12 15 10 7 11 
Other 15 14 14 14 22 14 11 17 
l1I 
Source: Iowa Farm Finance Survey, 1991 and 1993 IO 
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consistency of the scale variable CROPINS. Rather than 
relying on this scale variable to measure the intensity of 
FCI use, the alternative specification measures effective 
coverage levels, the proportion of total expected output in 
1992 covered by FCI. 
One variable was formed for each of the two main crops 
in Iowa : corn (EFFCLCRN) and soybeans (EFFCLSOY). The 
effective coverage level for corn, EFFCLCRN, was calculated 
as a product of the ratio of corn acres insured by FCI in 
1992 ( CAi ns> to total corn acres planted in 1992 ( CApla.nt) and 
actual FCI coverage levels chosen for corn in 1992 crop year 
(LEVELCRN) 
CA . 
EFFCLCRN= ins LEVELCRN 
CAplan r: 
The effective coverage level for soybeans, EFFCLSOY, was 
calculated in the similar fashion. As mentioned earlier, 
there are currently four coverage levels available (35, 50, 
65, and 75%) for both corn and soybeans. Clearly, EFFCLCRN 
and EFFCLSOY are continuous variables with values restricted 
within the <0 ,75> interval . The lower bound is behavioral. 
The upper bound is the result of pol icy limitations. Thus, 
the two variables represent censored variables where the two 
extreme values represent no FCI insurance and full FCI insur-
ance, respectively . 
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Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the distribution of the propor-
tion of acres insured by FCI for corn and soybeans, respec-
tively. In both cases, slightly more than a half of the 
respondents insured all of their cropland. The other half of 
farm operators had no FCI insurance in 1992. Very few farm-
ers insured only some part of their planted corn or soybean 
acres. Consequently, the distributions of the actual (chosen 
by farmers) and effective (calculated) FCI coverage levels 
are almost identical (Table 5.10). 
Table 5.10 Distribution of the actual and effective FCI 
coverage levels in 1992 
Coverage level (%} % observations 
Corn Soybeans 
Actual 
0 54.4 59.1 
35 0.1 0.3 
50 2.6 1.2 
65 24.1 22.1 
75 18.8 17 . 3 
Effective 
0 54.4 59.1 
1-35 0.8 0.8 
36-50 3.7 2.2 
51-65 23.9 21. 6 
66-75 17.2 16.3 
Source: Iowa Farm Finance Survey, 1991 and 1993 
Undoubtedly, all three of the above discussed variables, 
i.e . , the intensity of the use of FCI (CROPINS) and the 1992 
FCI effective coverage levels for corn and soybeans (EFFCLCRN 
and EFFCLSOY) are alternative representations of the same 
Number of observations 
500 · ..... ,. 
400 
300 
200 
100 
0 1-50 
62 
51 -99 100 
Corn acres insured by FCI ( % of corn acres planted) 
Figure 5.1 Proportion of planted corn acres insured by FCI 
in 1992 
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Number of observations 
400 
300 . - .. . . .. ...... . - ... : . .. . ... . ... ... .... . . ...... . . .. . .. .. _ ... . 
. . 
=: 
200 . . . . . . . . . .... .. ... . . .. ... ...... .. . - ...... . - ..... 1 - . .. - • •. . : '.· 
100 
0 1-50 51-99 100 
Soybean acres insured by FCI ( % of soybean acres) 
Figure 5.2 Proportion of planted acres of soybean insured by 
FCI in 1992 
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thing. The difference between them is in that CROPINS repre-
sents the typical use of FCI over several years, whereas 
EFFCLCRN and EFFCLSOY are relevant only to 1992 crop year. 
In addition, CROPINS is a scale variable, a subjective mea-
sure, while EFFCLCRN and EFFCLSOY are objective measured 
responses. 
Since the variable CROPINS and the variables EFFCLCRN 
and EFFCLSOY represent the same thing, farmers' preferences 
for FCI revealed by these two alternative representations 
should be consistent. In order to see that, chi-squared 
tests of general association between CROPINS and the 
effective FCI coverage levels for corn, EFFCLCRN, and soy-
beans, EFFCLSOY, were conducted. Frequency distributions of 
the effective coverage levels by the use of FCI are shown in 
Table 5.11 (corn) and Table 5.12 (soybeans). Test statistics 
(also listed in the tables) indicate statistically signifi-
cant, strong positive association between the actual FCI 
coverage levels in 1992 and the ordered categorical variable 
CROPINS (the intensity of FCI use) . 
This allows us to conclude that farmers' perception of 
the extent to which they use FCI (revealed on the 5-point 
scale) was consistent with the actual FCI coverage levels 
chosen by these farmers for 1992 crop year. 
Table 5.11 Distribution of the 1992 FCI effective coverage levels for corn by the 
intensity of the use of FCI 
Corn Intensity of the use 
effective 
coverage Never Sometimes 
level % 
1 2 3 
0 226 139 23 
1-35 na 0 0 
36- 5 0 na 0 1 
51- 65 na 2 7 
66- 75 na 1 2 
Total 226 142 33 
Ch i -square statistic 670.3 7 8 OF 16 
Ph i coefficient 0.956 
na - not applicable 
Source: Iowa Farm Finance Survey , 1993 
of FCI (absolute frequencies} 
Always 
Total 
4 5 
11 na 399 
1 5 6 
1 2 14 27 
38 129 176 
29 94 126 
9 1 242 734 
P-value 0 . 000 
Percent 
54.4 
0.8 
3.7 
23.9 
17.2 
100.0 
Table 5.12 Distribution of the 1992 FCI effective coverage levels for soybeans by 
the intensity of the use of FCI 
Soybean Intensity of the use of FCI (absolute frequencies) 
effective 
coverage Never Sometimes Always 
level % Total Percent 1 2 3 4 5 
0 168 111 29 37 na 345 59.1 
1-35 na 0 0 1 4 5 0.8 
36-50 na 0 0 7 6 13 2.2 
51-65 na 2 3 21 100 126 21. 6 
66-75 na 1 2 20 72 95 16.3 
Total 168 114 34 86 182 584 100 .0 
Chi-square statistic 482.550 OF 16 P-value 0 . 000 
Phi coefficient 0.909 
na - not applicable 
Source: Iowa Farm Finance Survey, 1993 
°' °' 
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Explanatory Variables and Hypothesized Relationships 
This section presents factors relevant to the Federal 
Crop Insurance (FCI) participation decision that were identi-
fied in Chapter 3 in the form of explanatory variables of FCI 
logistic regression models. The variables are grouped into 
five categories defined at the end of Chapter 3. The 
hypothesized relationship of each variable to farmer's FCI 
decision is stated along with its definition and units of 
measurement (with the exception of unit-less variables, such 
as ratios). The variable names by which they are identified 
later in the text are listed in parenthesis. 
Demographic characteri stics 
Age of farm operator - years (AGE) 
Although it may not affect crop insurance purchases 
directly, a farmer's age is reflected in factors such as debt 
and equity levels, the proportion of land rented in total 
land operated, farmer's risk aversion, and familiarity with 
risk concepts and tools. Older farmers tend to have lower 
debt levels, more equity, operate smaller farms, and rent 
less land than younger farm operators. All of these factors 
would reduce the need for crop insurance. Therefore, farme-
r's age is expected to b e negatively associated with the use 
of FCI. 
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The highest completed level of education of wife and hus-
band -1.high school 2.community college 3.college 4.post 
graduate (EDW, EDH) 
Education increases a person's awareness of risk issues 
as well as his/her understanding of possible ways of 
transferring risk . Farm operators with higher education are, 
thus, more likely to use Federal Crop Insurance as a way of 
reducing production risk . 
Farming experience - years (YRSFARM) 
Because of strong positive correlation between farmer's 
age and his farming experience, the latter is considered an 
alternative representation of the former . The variable 
YRSFARM is, therefore, expected to negatively influence FCI 
participation for the same reasons as the variable AGE. 
Farm characteristics 
Farm size - total acres operated (ACROPER) 
Bigger farms tend to have higher total output and, thus, 
more value is in risk of loss for larger f arm operations . In 
other words, bigger farm operations face larger absolute 
losses. Also, larger farms tend to rely more heavily on 
income derived from farming and have lower income from off-
farm activities . For these reasons, farm size is hypothe-
sized to have positive effect on the use of FCI. 
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Gross farm sales - dollars (GROSSINC) 
This variable can be viewed as another measure of the 
size of a farm since higher sales are usually derived from 
larger farm operations. Thus, the same reasoning as for farm 
size measured by acres holds for farm size measured by gross 
sales. Hence, GROSSINC is hypothesized to be positively 
associated with the FCI use. 
The proportion of acres rented from others in total acres 
operated (RRENTOP) 
Rental arrangements (especially cash leases) increase 
the level of risk for a farm operator since he is obliged to 
make agreed-upon payments to a landlord regardless of actual 
crops harvested. Therefore, farmers operating the larger 
proportion of acreage rented are expected to use FCI more 
often. 
The proportion of total farm sales derived from crop produc-
tion (CROPS) 
The ratio of crop sales to total farm sales is, in a 
sense, a measure of farm diversification which is one of the 
ways of reducing farm business risk. Farms specialized in 
growing crops, those with the ratio close to one, are more 
likely candidates for FCI than those with high livestock 
numbers and fewer acres of crops. 
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Business risk management tools 
In order to illustrate farmers' use of all risk manage-
ment strategies, the frequency distributions of the scale 
variables for FCI and the six risk management strategies 
discussed below are presented in Table 5.13. On the basis of 
the mean scores of individual strategies it can be concluded 
that participation in government programs, FCI, and crop-hail 
insurance were the strategies employed most often. On the 
other hand, hedging and commodity options were used only 
rarely. Overall, risk management practices did not differ 
substantially for 1991 and 1993 FFS samples. 
The use of private crop-hail insurance - 1.never 2.seldom 
3.half of time 4.most of time 5. always (HAILINS) 
Crop-hail insurance can be viewed as a complement to 
multiple peril crop insurance since the two offer protection 
against different risks. Crop hail insures against rather 
isolated but possibly quite frequent losses due to hail 
storms, while multiple peril insures against low probability 
widespread crop failures due to flood, drought, and other 
perils. Since hail insurance deals with a different type of 
risk than FCI, it is expected to be positively associated 
with the use of FCI. 
Table 5.13 The intensity of the use of risk management strategies for the FFS 
samples 
Frequency of use 
strategy Year Never Sometimes Always Mean 
1 2 3 4 5 Scores 
Multiple peril 91 31. 2 9 .2 15.8 11. 2 32.6 3.04 
crop insurance 93 34.3 17.2 4.3 12.1 32.l 2.91 
Crop - hail 91 38.3 5.6 7.2 6.3 42.6 3.09 
insurance 93 35.5 9.5 3.8 12.2 39.0 3.10 
91 74.8 9.4 11. 0 3.8 1. 0 1.46 
Hedging 93 73.7 16.3 6.6 
-..) 
2.7 0.7 1.40 ~ 
91 47.8 11. 4 24.6 11.4 4.8 2.14 
Forward contracting 93 45.1 22.4 17.9 11.1 3.5 2.05 
91 77 . 3 8 . 4 9.9 3.3 1.1 1.42 
Commodity options 93 75.0 15.6 6.2 2.4 0.8 1. 38 
91 56.4 4 . 7 11. 5 8.1 19.3 2.20 
Crop share leases 93 56.8 9.1 7.4 7.8 18.9 2.23 
Participation in 91 9.1 2.4 8.1 17.0 63.4 4.20 
government programs 93 9.5 5.3 4.5 23.7 57.0 4.13 
Source: Iowa Farm Finance Survey, 1991 and 1993 
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Participation in government programs - 1.never 2.seldom 
3.half of time 4.most of time s. always (GOVTPROG) 
Although it is not required for FCI eligibility, partic-
ipation in government programs is expected to be positively 
related to the intensity of FCI purchases. The reason for 
that stems from the fact that most of the government programs 
(for example, deficiency payments and marketing loans) are 
designed primarily to reduce market price risk, not produc-
tion risk. 
The use of forward pricing tools, i.e., forward contracting, 
hedging, and commodity options - 1.never 2.seldom 3.half of 
time 4.most of time s. always (FORCONTR, HEDGING, COMMOPT) 
Forward pricing tools protect farmers against unfavor-
able price movements, but they do not address the problem of 
production risk, except , perhaps, for commodity options. 
Moreover, farmers who have contracte d for a certain amount o f 
their crop production for future delivery will have addition-
al incentives to secure the output suff icient to meet con-
tract requirements . Therefore, the three forward pricing 
tools are hypothesi z ed to be positively associated with the 
use of FCI. 
The use of crop share leases - 1.never 2.seldom 3.half of 
time 4.most of time s. always (CROPSHAR) 
Not all rental arrangements constitute h i gher risk than 
operating own land with own equipment. Crop share renta l 
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agreements, for example, do not increase risk level as do 
cash rental arrangements. Cash renting may require rental 
fees to be paid in cash regardless of an actual crop harvest-
ed . Hence, the fixed obligations resulting from cash renting 
increase the total variability of farm income stream. On the 
other hand, crop share leases, as the name suggests, call for 
the division of the actual crop between a tenant and a 
landlord. Therefore, the use of crop share leases does not 
give farmers additional incentives to participate in FCI. 
Farm financial performance 
Farm net worth - dollars (NETWRTH) 
Definition: Net worth = total farm assets - total farm 
debt. 
Farms with higher net worth are hypothesized to use less 
FCI than those with lower equity. The reason for this lies 
in the fact that, for two farms of the same size (measured by 
total assets), more equity means less debt and, thus, less 
financial risk and lower pressure to control business risk. 
In other words, net worth represents credit reserves since it 
can be used as a debt collateral. 
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The proportion of accrued off-farm income in net farm income 
(OFFINCR) 
Off-farm income is usually more stable than income 
derived from the farm operation and it serves as a cushion 
against high farm income variability. Therefore, the vari-
able OFFINCR is hypothesized to be negatively associated with 
the use of FCI. 
Total farm debt outstanding with Farmers Home Administra-
tion -dollars (FMHADEBT) 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, lenders may require farmers 
to buy crop insurance as a condition for extending loans. 
Although there are no regulatory requirements that producers 
carry FCI, FmHA strongly encourages farmers' participation in 
the FCIP. In some instances, farmers may actually be re-
quired by an FmHA officer to buy FCI. Consequently, the 
amount of FmHA debt and the use of FCI are expected to be 
positively associated. 
Profit margin ratio (MARGIN) 
Definition: Profit margin ratio = (net farm income + 
interest paid - family living expenses) / total gross income. 
Family living expenses were calculated using data from Judd 
(1991,1993). 
Prof it margin measures the return to the capital invest-
ment per unit of output or sales . It reflects the farm 
operator's ability to control cost, his farm management 
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performance, irrespective of financing and farm size. Since 
more profitable farms face relatively higher absolute losses, 
the variable MARGIN is hypothesized to be positively 
associated with the use of FCI. 
Asset turnover ratio (TURNOVER) 
Definition: Asset turnover ratio = total gross income / 
value of farm assets. 
Asset turnover measures the sales volume generated per 
dollar of investment. It is an index of the efficiency of 
capital utilization. The variable TURNOVER is expected to be 
negatively related to the use of FCI since more efficient 
farms have higher risk bearing capacity. 
Debt-to-equity ratio (DER) 
Definition: Debt-to-equity ratio = total farm debt 
outstanding / net worth. 
The debt-to-equity ratio is a measure of farm indebt-
ness. In other words, it represents the level of financial 
risk. Farm operations with higher DER face higher financial 
risk and are, therefore, more likely to control total risk 
level through limiting the amount of business risk. Accord-
ingly, DER is expected to have positive influence on the use 
of FCI. 
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Debt burden ratio (BURDENR) 
Definition: Debt burden ratio = net cash farm income I 
total farm debt. 
The debt burden ratio measures net cash income generated 
by farm operation per each dollar of outstanding farm debt. 
It is a measure of farm solvency, of farm's ability to repay 
debt. Better solvency position contributes to risk bearing 
capacity of a farm, thus, reducing the need for FCI. 
The value of liquid assets - dollars (LIQAS) 
Definition: Liquid assets = cash in checking and sav-
ings accounts + financial investments (CDs, mutual funds) + 
crop and livestock for sale (including CCC crops under loan). 
Liquid assets are assets that can be converted into cash 
almost instantaneously without causing a substantial loss of 
their value. Therefore, they constitute financial reserves 
that can be used as a supplemental source of cash. Farms 
with high level of liquid assets are more likely to withstand 
unfavorable circumstances . Therefore, farm liquidity is 
hypothesized to be negatively associated with the use of FCI. 
Gross ratio (GROSS) 
Definition: Gross ratio = total farm operating expens-
es/ gross farm sales. 
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The gross ratio measures operating expenses of a farm 
per dollar of farm output. In other words, it is an index of 
farm efficiency. More efficient farm operations have lower 
gross ratios. With respect to FCI, farm's efficiency, or 
productivity, has the same effect as does its profitability. 
Consequently, more efficient farms are expected to use more 
FCI. 
The location of a farm operation 
crop reporting district - l most of farming operation located 
within a crop reporting district, o otherwise (CRD2 - 9) 
Together, there are nine crop reporting districts in the 
State of Iowa (one dummy variable was created for eight of 
them). Figure 5.3 outlines crop reporting districts on the 
Iowa county map. The reason for including farm location 
among the factors explaining FCI participation is that soil 
and weather conditions, as well as farm enterprise 
specialization are not completely uniform across the entire 
State of Iowa. These differences may result in different FCI 
participation rates in individual districts. 
Models Tested 
Based on the discussion of this and the previous chap-
ters, the logistic regression model of the use of FCI can be 
expressed in the form 
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for j=l, ... ,4, where~ is the empirical cumulative logit (log 
odds ratio) for the jm response level of the variable 
CROPINS, ln is a natural logarithm, and Pj is the cumulative 
probability, the probability that an individual will choose 
the CROPINS response level less than or equal to j. The 
right-hand side of the regression model consists of the 
intercept term a i , the vectors of demographic 
characteristics, farm characteristics, business risk 
management tools, farm financial characteristics, and farm 
location X1 - X5 , and finally, the unknown parameter vectors 
The maximum likelihood estimation of the model yields the 
estimates of four intercept terms, one for each (except the 
last) CROPINS response level. Also, one p parameter is 
estimated for each explanatory variable. Using these esti-
mates, the cumulative probabilities, ~, are computed first. 
Next, from the cumulative probabilities ~, probabilities for 
the individual CROPINS response levels are calculated 
Prob(CROPINS=j) = P, for j=l Never 
for j=2 Seldom, 3 Half of time, 
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and for 4 Most of time, and 
for j=5 Always 
These probabilities are referred to as the FCI probabilities 
later in the text. The FCI probabilities are reported in the 
next chapter along with the estimated regression coef-
ficients . 
Finally, the marginal effects of the explanatory vari-
ables on the FCI probabilities Prob(CROPINS= j) are evaluated . 
The two logistic regression models of FCI use were estimated . 
They differed only in the sample analyzed. Model 1 analyzed 
1991 data while Model 2 examined the 1993 sample. For both 
models, the same set of explanatory variables was tested. 
Both models were analyzed using the standard SAS package . 
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6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter presents and discusses regression analysis 
results. Parameter and probability estimates, marginal 
effects of regressors, as well as model fit for the two 
logistic regression models are discussed separately. Then, 
regression parameter estimates of the two models are compared 
to examine their stability over time. Finally, the results 
are discussed in the last section of the chapter. 
Estimation Strategy 
Two logistic regression models were estimated in the 
form outlined in the previous chapter , one for each Farm 
Finance Survey sample . Same set of explanatory variables, 
also discussed in the previous chapter, was used in the two 
models. Initially, all explanatory variables were included 
in the models. In order to identify variables that were 
insignificant in explaining the use of FCI and to reduce the 
number of regression parameters to be estimated, backward and 
stepwise regression methods were applied to both models . 
The backward selection technique examines chi-squared 
univariate tests based on the maximum likelihood estimation 
of all regression parameters. In each step, the least 
significant variable among those that do not meet a specified 
82 
significance level is removed from the model. In other 
words, the variable with the smallest contribution to the 
explanatory power of the model is removed from a model. Once 
a variable is eliminated from the model in this way, it is 
not allowed to enter the model again. 
In the stepwise selection, on the other hand, using the 
same criteria as in the backward selection, each variable can 
be entered and removed from the model many times. The model 
building process continues until all variables that already 
are in the model meet the specified significance level to 
stay in the model and none of the variables that are not in 
the model meets the specified entry level. A relatively high 
(0.50%) significance level was chosen for variable entry 
while a slightly lower significance level (0.40%) was 
specified for variables to stay in the model in order to 
avoid the exclusion of variables that contribute to the model 
but whose regression parameters are not significant. Keeping 
in mind possible deficiencies of the variable searching 
techniques, the results of both backward and stepwise 
regressions were carefully examined in order to identify the 
variables with low explanatory power. 
The results show that the following variables seem to 
have low explanatory power with respect to farmers' decision 
to participate in the Federal Crop Insurance Program: 
farmer's age (AGE), the education of both wife and husband 
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(EDW, EDH), farming experience (EXPER), farm size (ACROPER, 
GROSSINC), the percentage of crop sales in total sales 
(CROPS), the use of forward contracting (FORCONTR), hedging 
(HEDGING), and crop share leases (CROPSHAR), asset turnover 
ratio (TURNOVER), and the ratio of off-farm income to total 
income (OFFINCR). Also, six crop reporting district dummy 
variables (CRD 2, 4, and 5-8) appeared to be insignificant in 
explaining the intensity of FCI use. Therefore, these 
variables were not included in the final regression models. 
Consequently, the final logistic regression model for both 
1991 and 1993 samples involved 13 explanatory variables. 
Model 1 (1991 sample) 
The first regression model analyzed the 1991 data set. 
The estimated regression parameters are shown in Table 6.1. 
At this point, an important fact that applies to both logit 
models estimated should be stressed. Because of the way in 
which the empirical logits are defined, the signs of the 
estimated regression coefficients are just opposite from 
parameter signs resulting from the usual linear regressions. 
For example, the parameter estimate -0.0537 for the variable 
RRENTOP (Table 6.1) implies that this variable (the ratio of 
acres rented to acres operated) has a positive impact on the 
probability of FCI participation. The best way to see that 
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Table 6.1 The estimated regression parameters for Model 1991 
Variable Parameter Standard 
estimate error 
Intercept 1 0.4962 0.6771 
Intercept 2 1. 1292• 0.6785 
Intercept 3 1.8810··· 0.6838 
Intercept 4 2.4860··· 0.6898 
RRENTOP -0.0537 0 . 3349 
FMHADEBT -2.58E-6 2.679E-6 
HAI LINS -0.1655 .. 0.0645 
GOVTPROG -0.3049··· 0.1164 
COMMOPT -0.3139••• 0.1186 
MARGIN -0.3201 0.2867 
LIQAS 2.628E-6 .. 1. 313E-6 
BURDENR 0.0295 0.0292 
NETWRTH 9.451E-7• 5.314E-7 
DER -0 . 0171 0.0238 
GROSS -0.3146 0.4824 
CRD3 1.1767 ... 0.2991 
CRD9 -0.9623. 0.4987 
Number of observations: 304 
a variable significant at 1% level 
" 5% level 
" 10% level 
Variable 
mean 
0.473 
15773 
3.388 
4.461 
1.658 
0.025 
118833 
1.142 
386235 
0.916 
0.675 
0.171 
0.063 
is to look at marginal effects of regressors on the estimated 
FCI probabilities. 
As shown in Chapter 4, a negative P parameter reduces 
the probability that an individual will choose the CROPINS 
response level l=Never, and, at the same time, it increases 
the probability that the level 5=Always will be chosen. 
Therefore, variables with negative regression coefficients 
increase the probability of FCI participation. In the case 
of the variable RRENTOP, then, the negative sign of the 
estimated regression coefficient means that farmers who rent 
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more land are more likely to use FCI. Other estimated 
regression parameters and their impact on the FCI 
probabilities can be interpreted in the same fashion. 
For the 1991 sample, seven variables were significant in 
explaining FCI participation. The results suggest that the 
use of private hail insurance (HAILINS) and commodity options 
(COMMOPT), participation in government programs (GOVTPROG), 
and the location of a farm in the crop reporting district 9 
(CRD9 -south-east) appear to increase the likelihood of FCI 
participation. On the other hand, liquid asset holdings 
(LIQAS), net worth (NETWRTH), and the fact that a farm is 
located in the crop reporting district 3 (CRD3 - north-east) 
seem to reduce the probability of FCI purchases. All of 
these relationships were as hypothesized. 
As mentioned earlier, the sign and statistical 
significance of the estimated regression coefficients can be 
interpreted quite easily. However, that is not the case with 
the magnitude of the estimated parameters. The marginal 
effects were calculated for individual explanatory variables 
in order to interpret the magnitude of the influence of these 
variables on the estimated FCI probabilities (the 
probabilities with which indi vidual CROPINS response levels 
are chosen). The estimated FCI probabilities as well as the 
marginal effects, all evaluated at the means of the 
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explanatory variables of the routine data set, are displayed 
in Table 6.2. 
The first row of Table 6.2 lists the five response 
levels of the variable CROPINS, in other words, the five 
intensity levels of the use of FCI. The second row shows the 
predicted probabilities for each of the response levels. The 
probability value 0.201485 in the first column, for instance, 
means that there is approximately 20 % probability that a 
representative 1991 farmer would choose to never use FCI. A 
"representative farmer'' refers to a hypothetical respondent 
whose characteristics have values equal to the means of the 
explanatory variables. The predicted probabilities for the 
five response levels are referred to as the estimated FCI 
probabilities. 
The columns of Table 6.2 represent the marginal effects 
of the explanatory variables on probabilities of the 
respective FCI levels. For example, the probability that a 
farmer will never use FCI decreases by 0.026627 when the 
value of HAILINS increases by one. The interpretation of 
the marginal effect is slightly different for dummy 
variables. For instance, the marginal effect of CRD3 on the 
first CROPINS probability level is 0.229927. It means that 
the probability that a farmer from North-Eastern Iowa will 
never use FCI is by 0.229927 higher than is the same 
Table 6.2 The estimated probabilities for CROPINS and the marginal effects of the 
explanatory variables on these probabilities for Model 1 
CROPINS 
Probability 
RRENTOP 
FMHADEBT 
HAI LINS 
GOVTPROG 
COMMOPT 
MARGIN 
LIQAS 
BURDENR 
NETWRTH 
DER 
GROSS 
CRD3 
CRD9 
1 Never 
0.201485 
-8.6397E-3 
-4.1509E-7 
-0 .026627 
-0.049055 
-0.050503 
-0.051500 
4.2282E-7 
4.7462E-3 
1.5206E-7 
-2.7512E- 3 
-0 .050616 
0.229927 
-0.118273 
2 Seldom 
0.120636 
-3.0862E-3 
-1.4827E-7 
-9.5114E-3 
-0.017523 
-0.018040 
-0.018396 
1. 5103E-7 
1. 6954E-3 
5.4315E-8 
-9 .8274E-4 
-0.018080 
0.047803 
-0.055285 
3 Half of 
time 
0.179819 
-l.6989E-3 
-8.1624E-8 
-5.2360E-3 
-9.6462E-3 
-9 . 9309E-3 
-0.010127 
8 . 3143E-8 
9.3330E-4 
2 . 9900E-8 
-5.4100E-4 
-9.9531E-3 
-0.001894 
-0.053102 
4 Most of 
time 
0.146630 
1. 1851E-3 
5 .6939E-8 
3.6525E- 3 
6.7290E-3 
6.9276E-3 
7.0644E-3 
-5.8000E-8 
-6.5105E-4 
-2.0858E-8 
3.7739E-4 
6.9430E-3 
-0.047092 
-0.007391 
5 Always 
0.351430 
0.012240 
5.8805E-7 
0.037722 
0.069495 
0.071546 
0.072959 
-5.9899E-7 
-6.7238E-3 
-2.1541E-7 
3.8976E-3 
0.071706 
-0.228745 
0.234052 
00 
-....J 
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probability for the same farmer were he operating elsewhere 
in Iowa. 
Note that the marginal effects in the first column of 
Table 6.2 have the same sign as the estimated regression 
coefficients. On the other hand, the marginal effects in the 
last column have the sign opposite to that of the respective 
regression coefficients. This is true for all explanatory 
variables in both models since it follows directly from the 
definition of the marginal effects for the first and last 
response levels, respectively. The marginal effects for the 
three middle response levels of CROPINS, however, cannot be 
predicted without calculating the respective probability 
quantities, cf. Chapter 4 for the definitions of the marginal 
effects. 
Note also that the marginal effects add up to zero 
(except for rounding errors) for each independent variable . 
This follows directly from the fact that the estimated FCI 
probabilities add up to one. 
In order to assess model fit, the log-likelihood chi-
squared test, the prediction rate, and the pseudo-R2 ratio 
were calculated and are shown in Table 6 .3 . The log-
likelihood test indicates that the model is statistically 
significant. That me ans, the joint hypothesis that all 
regression coefficie nts are equal to zero can be rejected. 
The prediction rate shows that the model correctly predicted 
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Table 6.3 Goodness of fit of Model 1991 
- 2 LOG Likelihood 
Degrees of freedom 
P-value 
Prediction rate 
Pseudo ~ 
76.662 
13 
0.0001 
70 . 1 
0.09 
the value of the variable CROPINS for 70 % of the 
observations. The low pseudo-R2 , showing that only 9% of the 
variation of the dependent variable was explained by the 
model, may be due to the cross-sectional character of the 
data. Also, the pseudo-R2 can be low if some factors 
relevant to the FCI decisions were left out of the model. 
This is certainly case in this analysis . The impact of the 
FCI premiums as well as the ava i lability of government 
disaster programs on the intensity o f FCI purchases have not 
been captured by the models. Furthermore, the data reflected 
the farm income situation only in the year directly preceding 
the year of the data collection. Also, farm financial 
statements reflected the situation only during the two years 
preceding the survey. In other words , any prior influences 
were omitted from the analysis. 
In summary , the results of Model 1991 suggest that the 
location of a farm, three risk management strategies, namely, 
hail insurance, government programs , and commodity options, 
and also farm equity and farm liquid asset holdings seem to 
have signif i cant inf luence on the probability that FCI is 
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used. In particular, farm equity values and liquid assets 
tend to reduce the probability of FCI participation. Also, 
the same effect has farm location in North-Eastern Iowa. On 
the other hand, the use of hail insurance, government 
programs, and commodity options tend to increase the 
likelihood of FCI purchases . In addition, farms located in 
South-Eastern Iowa seem to use FCI more often. 
Model 2 (1993 sample) 
The second regression model analyzed the 1993 data . The 
estimated regression parameters for the explanatory variables 
of Model 1993 are shown in Table 6.4 . Eight variables were 
significant at the 10% level. Accordingly, the use of 
private hail insurance {HAILINS), participation in government 
programs {GOVTPROG), profit margin {MARGIN), debt-to-equity 
ratio (DER), gross ratio {GROSS), and the location of a farm 
in South-Eastern Iowa {CRD9) seem to have a positive effect 
on the probability that FCI is used. On the other hand, the 
location of a farm in North-Eastern Iowa {CRD3) and the 
proportion of acres rented (RRENTOP) seem to reduce the 
probability of FCI participation. 
These results are consistent with the original 
hypothesis, except for two variables. First, the ratio of 
acres rented to acres operated was hypothesized to have 
positive impact on FCI participation. Second, the gross 
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Table 6.4 The estimated regression parameter s for Model 1993 
Variable Parameter Standard Variable 
estimate error mean 
Int ercept 1 3. 6461 ... 0.8970 
Int ercept 2 4 . 7444 ... 0 . 9191 
I ntercept 3 5 . 1240°00 0.9271 
Intercept 4 5 . 8042 ... 0.9417 
RRENTOP 0 . 8732 .. 0.4326 0.447 
FMHADEBT -4.55E-6 3.901E-6 9722 
HAI LINS -0.2050°0 0.0820 3.315 
GOVTPROG -0.8201 ... 0.1658 4.332 
COMM OPT -0.2640 0.1620 1. 560 
MARGIN -0.4547°0 0.1820 -0.421 
LIQAS 5 . 333E-7 1.157E-6 134 727 
BURDENR 0.0605 0.0801 0.926 
NETWRTH 7.7 75E-7 6.015E-7 371405 
DER -o. 0768° 0.0406 0.830 
GROSS -1. 7755••• 0.6255 0 . 689 
CRD3 2 .1016°0 0 0.4107 0.159 
CRD9 -1.4794 .. 0.6424 0 . 065 
Number of observations: 
a variable significant at 1% level 
" 5% level 
" 10% level 
ratio (the ratio of operating expenses to gross farm sales} 
was expected to be negative l y associated with the use of FCI. 
However, the results of Model 1993 suggest just the opposite 
for these two variables. The results of both models are 
discussed in the second part of this chapter. 
The estimated FCI probabilities were evaluated at the 
means of the explanatory variables , using the estimated 
regression coefficients . The estimated FCI probabilities for 
Model 1993 are presented in Table 6. 5 . Also, the marginal 
effects of the explanatory v ariables on the FCI probabilities 
are shown in the same table . The interpretation of Table 6.5 
Table 6.5 .The estimated probabilit ies for CROPINS and the marginal effects of the 
explanatory variables on these probabilities for Model 2 
CROP INS 1 Never 2 Seldom 3 Half of 4 Most of 5 Always 
time time 
Probability 0.253098 0.246870 0.097696 0.148061 0.254275 
RRENTOP 0.165827 0.052438 -8.6793E-3 -0.044768 -0.164817 
FMHADEBT -8.6408E-7 -2.7324E-7 4.5225E-8 2.3327E-7 8.5882E-7 
HAI LINS -0.038931 -0.012311 2.0376E-3 0.010510 0.038694 
GOVTPROG -0.155743 -0.049249 8.1515E-3 0.042046 0.154795 
COMMOPT -0.050135 -0.015854 2.6241E-3 0.013535 0.049830 
MARGIN -0.086351 -0 . 027306 4.5195E-3 0.023312 0 . 085825 
LIQAS 1 . 0128E-7 3 . 2026E-8 -5.3008E-9 -2.7342E-8 -1. 0066E-7 
BURDENR 0 . 011489 3.6332E-3 -6.0135E-4 -3.1018E-3 -0.011419 
NETWRTH 1.4765E-7 4.6691E-8 -7.7280E-9 -3.9862E- 8 -1. 4675E-7 \0 
DER -0.014585 -4.6121E-3 7.6336E-4 3.9375E- 3 0.014496 (\.) 
GROSS -0.337176 -0.106624 0.017648 0.091028 0.335127 
CRD3 0.470146 -0.036039 -0.053739 -0 ~ 113978 -0.266390 
CRD9 -0.193624 -0.131565 -0.024031 0 . 009591 0.339629 
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is analogous to that of Table 6.2 For instance, a unit 
increase in the variable HAILINS reduces the probability that 
FCI will never be used by 0.038931, and, at the same time, it 
increases the probability that FCI will be used always by 
0.038694. Hence, a more intense use of hail insurance 
increases the likelihood of FCI participation. For the 
discrete variable CRD 3 , for exampl e, the marginal effect 
value in the first column shows that the probability that FCI 
is not used at all is by 0 . 470146 higher for a representative 
farmer in North-Eastern Iowa than it is for the same farmer 
operating elsewhere in the State . 
Table 6.6 presents the statistics for assessing the 
model fit. They indicate that the overall model is 
significant, with the prediction rate 78 %. Again, the 
pseudo-R2 test is low for the reasons discussed for Model 
1991. 
In summary, the results of Models 1 and 2 are in a close 
agreement. Farmers operating in North-Eastern Iowa seem to 
be less likely to participate in FCI . On the other hand, the 
likelihood of parti cipation in the FCIP tends to be higher 
among farm operators who use other risk transfer tools , hail 
insurance and government programs in particular. Also, 
farmers who operate in south-Eastern Iowa are more likely to 
purchase FCI coverage for their crops. Furthermore, highly 
leveraged farms have higher probability of FCI use. 
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Table 6.6 Goodness of fit of Model 1993 
- 2 LOG Likelihood 
Degrees of freedom 
P-value 
Prediction rate 
Pseudo R2 
115.805 
13 
0.0001 
78.0 
0.17 
All of these relationships were as hypothesized. 
However, as already mentioned, the result for the ratio 
of land rented to land operated does not correspond with the 
original expectations . Also, Model 1993 gives rather 
contradictive results with respect to farm efficiency and its 
influence on the use of FCI. The variable Profit Margin 
suggests that farms with higher capital utilization are more 
likely to buy FCI . The variable Gross Ratio, to the 
contrary, indicates that more efficient farms have lower 
probability of using FCI . All results are discussed later in 
this chapter. 
Comparison Between 1991 and 1993 Results 
As already mentioned, the two data sets represented two 
different samples, but they were both drawn from the same 
population - the population of Iowa farmers. Thus, some 
additional insights to the relationship between the factors 
analyzed and the probability of FCI participation can be 
gained by looking at the comparison of the two sets of the 
estimated regression coefficients and the estimated FCI 
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probabilities. Such comparison may reveal the stability of 
the relationships between the explanatory variables and the 
use of FCI over time. However, it should not be expected 
that the two models will be exactly the same. The two models 
may reflect differences in the economic, legal, and social 
environment in which farmers operated, since the data were 
collected with the time lag of two years . Also, the 
differences in the models may reflect a shift in farmers' 
preferences for FCI as well as for other factors relevant to 
the FCI participation decision. 
Nonetheless, the two models were compared in order to 
identify factors whose influence on FCI participation seemed 
to be important regardless of the time period during which 
the data were collected. For this purpose, the estimated 
regression coefficients are compared in Table 6.7. 
The comparison of Model 1991 and Model 1993 shows that 
the results of the two models are very similar. The two 
models closely agree with each other with respect to the 
predicted direction of the effect of the explanatory 
variables on FCI. The only variable for which the regression 
coefficient sign differs in the two models is the ratio of 
acres rented to acres operated. However, the 1991 estimated 
regression parameter is not significantly different from 
zero. The magnitudes o f the estimated slope coefficients of 
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Table 6.7 The comparison of the estimated regression 
parameters for Models 1 and 2 
Variable 
Intercept 1 
Intercept 2 
Intercept 3 
Intercept 4 
RRENTOP 
FMHADEBT 
HAILI NS 
GOVTPROG 
COMMOPT 
MARGIN 
LIQAS 
BURDENR 
NETWRTH 
DER 
GROSS 
CRD3 
CRD9 
Estimated regression coefficient 
Model 1991 
0 . 4962 
1.1292° 
i. 8810··· 
2.4860 ... 
-0.0537 
-2.58E-6 
-o .1655°0 
-0.3049 ... 
-0.3139°00 
-0.3201 
2. 628E-6°
0 
0.0295 
9. 451E-7° 
-0.0171 
-0.3146 
1.1767°00 
-0.9623° 
Model 1993 
3.6461··· 
4.7444°
00 
5 .1240
000 
5.8042°
00 
0.8732°
0 
-4.55E-6 
-0.2050
00 
-0.8201··· 
-0.2640 
-0.4547° 0 
5.333E-7 
0.0605 
7.775E-7 
-0.0768° 
-1. 7755
000 
2. 1016 ... 
-1.4794°0 
••• a variable significant at 1% level .. 
" 
11 5% level • II II 10% level 
Model 1991 also correspond to those of the Model 1993 
estimates. As is illustrated later in this chapter, the 
estimated coefficients of the two models result in 
approximately same percentage changes in the respective FCI 
probabilities. However, the intercept terms of 
the two models are considerably different. The estimated 
intercept terms for the 1993 model are higher than those of 
the 1991 model. This may be a consequence of the lower means 
of the explanatory variables in 1993 compared to 1991. 
Another way of comparing the two regression models is to 
look at the estimated FCI probabilities for the five response 
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levels of the variable CROPINS that measures the intensity o f 
the use of FCI (Table 6.8). As Table 6.8 suggests, Model 
1993 predicts lower probabilities for the response levels 3 
and 5, and higher probabilities for the levels 1, 2, and 4 
than does Model 1991. In other words, it seems that the 
representative respondent in 1993 was less likely to 
participate in FCI 
Table 6.8 The comparison of the estimated probabilities for 
Models 1 and 2 
The estimated probability 
CROP INS level 
Model 1991 Model 1993 
1 - Never 0.201485 0.253098 
2 - Seldom 0.120636 0.246870 
3 - Half of time 0.179819 0.097696 
4 - Most of time 0.146630 0.148061 
5 - Always 0.351430 0.254275 
compared to the average 1991 respondent. This result 
corresponds to the fact that 1993 respondents used FCI less, 
on average, than 1991 respondents. The differences in the 
estimated FCI probabilities result not only from the 
differences in the estimated regression coefficients, but 
also from the differences in the means of the explanatory 
variables for the two models. Compared to 1991, an average 
1993 respondent had lower FmHA debt, used risk management 
strategies less often, experienced considerably lower 
profitability and higher liquidity, and also had lower 
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relative debt level. According to the original hypothesis, 
such differences suggest less intense use of FCI in 1993 
compared to 1991. Thus, the lower predicted probability of 
the FCI use in 1993 appears to be consistent with the 
hypothesis. However, there is also some evidence 
contradicting the expectations in that the average 1993 
farmer experienced lower solvency and had lower value of farm 
equity than the average farm in 1991. This would suggest 
higher need for FCI in 1993. It appears, however, that the 
impact of lower solvency and lower net worth on the FCI 
probabilities was outweighed by the influence of the other 
factors just described. 
Discussion 
This analysis attempted to answer the question which 
factors, beyond insurance premiums and the availability of 
government disaster payments, influence farmers' decision to 
participate in the FCIP. In order to do that, the 
relationship between the intensity of the use of FCI and 
several socio-economic factors was analyzed. The variables 
hypothesized to be relevant to the FCI participation decision 
were grouped into the five categories. The first was the 
group of farmers' demographic characteristics, such as age, 
education, and experience . The second set of variables 
represented farm size and enterprise mix . Next, the group of 
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variables reflecting farmers risk management practices 
included six business risk transfer tools dealing with both 
yield and price risk. The fourth category of the variables 
illustrated financial structure and conditions of farm 
operations. Finally, the set of dummy variables indicated 
farm location within the state of Iowa . The results for each 
of the five groups of variables are discussed individually. 
Demographic characteristics 
In the initial models, the following demographic 
characteristics were considered: the age of a farm operator, 
the education of both husband and wife, and finally 
operator's experience in farming . All four demographic 
variables were insignificant in both models. Hence, the 
analysis leads to the conclusion that farmer's age, 
education, and experience do not seem to exert significant 
influence on farmers' decisions regarding FCI. However, it 
is possible that these factors influence the FCI 
participation decision indirectly, through the influence of 
other variables . For instance, younger farmers tend to rent 
more land, have higher financial leverage and lower equity 
values than older farm operators . Also, differences in 
education can be reflected in farmers' risk awareness and 
knowledge of risk management strategies . 
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Farm characteristics 
The following farm characteristics were included in the 
original models: total acres operated, gross farm income, the 
ratio of crop sales to total sales, and the ratio of acres 
rented to acres operated. The results of the two regression 
models suggest that farm size and the proportion of crop 
sales in total farm sales seem to have an insignificant 
impact on the probability that FCI is used. 
The last of the farm characteristics, however, seems to 
influence FCI purchases. The 1991 results imply that farmers 
who rent relatively more land are more likely to participate 
in the FCIP, although not significantly so. This result 
confirms the hypothesis. Farmers who operate relatively more 
rented land face higher risk due to their obligation to make 
payments to their landlords. Therefore, they may be more 
interested in controlling yield risk by using crop insurance. 
The results of the 1993 model, however, do not support 
the hypothesis. The 1993 results suggest that farmers with 
relatively less rented land are more likely to buy FCI. A 
possible explanation for this contradiction is that the 
variable representing acres rented relative to acres operated 
includes the influence of one or more variables not included 
in the model. One of the variables possibly missing from the 
model is the use of crop share leases . The data show that 
crop share leases become more important as the relative 
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amount of rented land rises (Table 6.9). Since crop share 
rental arrangements also entail risk sharing between a farmer 
and a landlord, farmers who rent relatively more land, that 
is, those who use crop share rental agreements more often, 
may need FCI less. 
Farmers' risk management practices 
Altogether, the influence of six risk management 
strategies on the use of FCI was considered. The analysis 
showed three of them to play a significant role in FCI 
decisions. The predicted probability of the use of FCI was 
higher for those farmers who used hail insurance, government 
programs, and also commodity options (the 1991 model only) 
more often. Thus, the three business risk tools seem to be 
complements, rather than substitutes, to FCI. These results 
agree with the expectations about the relationship between 
FCI and the three business risk management strategies. 
One reason why business risk management strategies may 
be complements is that their use may be a reflection of 
farmers' attitudes toward risk in general . Those farm 
operators who dislike business risk may choose to use more 
than one strategy and use risk management tools more often in 
order to reduce business risk exposure of their farms. On 
the other hand, farmers less concerned with business risk may 
choose to use risk management tools less often. 
( 
Table 6.9 The use of crop share leases by the relative amount of land rented by 
sample Iowa farmers in 1993 
Use of crop share leases 
Proportion 
of land 
rented 
Number 
of 
obs. Relative frequencies 
< 0.34 
0.34-1.00 
1. 00-1. 50 
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332 
68 " 
Never 
61. 0 
36.4 
44.0 
Seldom 
10.2 
13 . 9 
7.5 
Source: Iowa Farm Finance Survey, 1993 
Half of Most of 
time time 
4.2 11. 0 
11. 8 10.2 
5.9 8.8 
Always 
13.6 
27.7 
33.8 
Mean 
Scores 
1. 59 
2.79 
4.50 
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Another reason why individual business risk strategies 
can be complements, rather than substitutes, is the fact that 
they protect those who use them against different types of 
business risk. For instance, government programs and 
commodity options protect farmers primarily against 
unfavorable price developments. On the other hand, Federal 
Crop Insurance and private crop-hail insurance deal with 
yield risk. In addition, the difference multiple peril and 
hail insurance is in that they protect farmers against 
different kinds of yield risk. FCI is very useful in 
situations of a substantial crop failure due to flood, 
drought, crop diseases, and other perils. However, such 
situations usually do not happen every year. On the other 
hand, crop-hail insurance is more important in case of crop 
damage due to hail storms that are usually rather isolated 
and occur virtually every year. Since government programs, 
commodity options, hail insurance, and FCI target different 
types of business risk, they may well be perceived as 
complements by risk averse farmers. 
In order to evaluate the magnitude of the impact of the 
use of government programs, hail insurance, and commodity 
options on the probability of FCI purchases, the marginal 
effects presented in Tables 6.2 and 6.5 were analyzed in more 
details. As discussed earlier, the marginal effects of 
explanatory variables represent changes in the FCI 
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probabilities, that is, in the probability that FCI is used 
Never, Seldom, Half of time, Most of time, or Always, 
resulting from unit changes in the explanatory variables. 
An increase in an explanatory variable with a negative 
regression coefficient reduces the probability that FCI is 
never used. At the same time, an equal increase in the value 
of that variable increases the probability that FCI is always 
used. This is always true regardless of the signs of the 
other estimated regression coefficients and regardless of the 
means of the explanatory variables included in the model. 
On the other hand, the probabilities of the three middle 
response levels, FCI used Seldom, Half of time, and Most of 
time, can change in either direction, as the marginal effect 
definition of Chapter 4 suggests. Therefore, the best way to 
illustrate the changes in the FCI probabi l ities resulting 
from the changes in the explanatory variables is to look at 
the changes in the probabilities of the two extreme response 
levels of the variable CROPINS: Never and Always. 
This approach is used to illustrate how the 
probabilities that FCI is never used and FCI is always used 
depend on different levels of the use of the three risk 
management strategies, hail insurance, government programs, 
and commodity options. 
Figure 6.1 depicts the changes in the predicted FCI 
probabilities associated with the changes of the variable 
1 
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0.2 
Figure 6.1 
Prob(CROPINS = j) 
2 3 4 
HAIL INSURANCE 
., 
. . . : 
t ·,• .. . ... " . ':' ;:-····= ·.: 
5 
1991 
--j =Never 
+j=Always 
The predicted FCI probabilities as a function of farmers' use of 
hail insurance 
a. 1991 
...... 
0 
Ul 
Prob(CROPINS = j) 
1 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
0 '----'..;;,;:_:_~~~~~~~;.....;.:.;.~~~~::.;...:.:;..:;,;,;,;;,;.;.~~~....:;.;.:.:..=;.;.;.;_;;__:...;.._J 
5 1 2 3 4 
HAIL INSURANCE 
Figure 6.1 
b. 
(continued) 
1993 
1993 
-- j =Never 
+ j=Always 
107 
HAILINS. As the value of HAILINS increases, in other words, 
as farmers use crop-hail insurance more often, the 
probability that FCI is never used decreases. At the same 
time, the probability that FCI is always used increases. 
Therefore, more frequent use of hail insurance increases the 
likelihood of FCI participation. 
Similarly, the results of both 1991 and 1993 models 
suggest that farmer's participation in government programs 
increases the chances that the farmer wil l also participate 
in the FCIP (Figure 6 . 2). 
Finally, for the 1991 model, farmers who use commodity 
options more often seem to buy FCI more often (Figure 6.3) . 
In other words, hail insurance, government programs, and 
commodity options appear to be complements to FCI. 
As mentioned earlier, three other risk management tools 
were initially included in the analysis, but they did not 
show a significant influence on the FCI probabilities. Among 
such variables were forward contracting and hedging. Since 
these two forward pricing tools do not seem to have 
significant impact on the use of FCI, it may be a little 
surprising that another forward pricing tool, commodity 
options, was found to have a substantial impact on the FCI 
probabilities in Model 1991 . It is possi ble, however, that 
the variable representing the use of commodity options 
reflected not only the impact of the use of this marketing 
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tool, but also an impact of some other variable, such as farm 
size. For the 1991 data set, larger farm operations used 
commodity options approximately 38 % more often than smaller 
farms (Table 6 . 10) . Hence, the evidence from the data 
supports the above reasoning about the impact of the use of 
commodity opt ions on FCI . 
still another risk management strategy initially 
included in the regression models was the use of crop share 
rental arrangements. This variable did not seem to exert a 
significant influence on the FCI probabilities. Nonetheless, 
its influence might have been revealed indirectly through 
another variable, such as the relative amount of land rented 
discussed earlier in this chapter. 
In summary, the results indicate that the use of hail 
insurance, commodity options, and government programs had a 
positive impact on the use of FCI. That means, these three 
business risk management tools seem to be complements, rather 
than substitutes, to FCI. on the other hand, forward 
contracting and hedging do not seem to have a considerable 
influence on the probabilities of FCI participation . Also, 
the use of crop share leases does not seem to play a 
significant role in FCI decisions, at least not directly. 
Table 6.10 The use of commodity options by farm size by sample Iowa farmers 
Use of commodity options 
Number 
Gross of Relative frequency 
sales ($) obs. 
Never Seldom Half of Most of Al ways 
time time 
:s; 250,000 561 77.5 8.9 10.5 2.5 0.5 
> 250,000 75 54.7 13 . 3 18 . 7 10 . 7 2.7 
Sourc e: Iowa Farm Finance Survey, 1991 
in 1991 
Mean 
scores 
1. 40 
1. 93 
...... 
...... 
N 
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Financial characteristics 
A total of nine measures of financial structure and 
performance of farm operations were considered in the 
analysis. Due to their low explanatory power, the proportion 
of off-farm income in total income and the asset turnover 
ratio were not included in the final models. Also, the 
amount of debt with Farmers Home Administration and farm 
solvency, measured by the debt burden ratio, did not seem to 
play a significant role in farmers' decision to buy FCI. The 
remaining five variables measuring financial condition of 
farms seem to have a significant impact on the probability of 
FCI participation. 
According to the results of Model 1991, farm net worth 
reduces the FCI probabilities. In other words, farmers with 
higher net worth seem to use FCI less frequently than farmers 
with lower equity values. This result supported the original 
hypothesis. Farm equity serves as a cushion against 
unfavorable circumstances. Had a farmer experienced 
substantial crop shortfall threatening his ability to meet 
all financial obligations, equity could be used as a 
collateral for existing or additional loans. In other words, 
the greater the net worth, the larger the credit reserve. 
Consequently, the farmer has a better chance to withstand 
difficulties resulting from crop failure. Thus, the same 
likelihood of crop loss represents higher risk to farmers 
114 
with lower equity values, even if their relative financial 
leverage was the same as that of farmers with high net worth. 
According to the risk balancing concept discussed in Chapter 
2, farmers with higher financial risk will tend to control 
their business risk exposure. Hence, they are expected to 
use FCI more often. The results seem to support this 
business - financial risk trade-off. 
The magnitude of the impact of changes in equity values 
on the predicted 1991 FCI probabilities are depicted in 
Figure 6.4 . The marginal effects of changes in farm equity 
values, presented earlier in this chapter, on the FCI 
probabilities are very small, generally of the order 10~ . 
Clearly, a one dollar change in net worth can hardly be 
expected to have a profound impact on farmers decisions in 
general, and on FCI decisions in particular. However, a ten 
thousand dollar change in equity may be enough to effect the 
FCI decisions. In fact, as the calculated marginal effects 
of the two models imply, each ten thousand dollar change in 
equity changes the FCI probabilities by approximately 0.7%. 
Accordingly, a one hundred thousand dollar change in equity 
values would be required to change the FCI probabilities in a 
more observable way (Figure 6.4). In particular, each hundred 
thousand dollar change in net worth would increase the 
probability that FCI is never used by approximately 7%. On 
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the other hand, the same change in net worth would reduce the 
probability that FCI is always used by 5%. The results are 
consistent with the expectations that farmers with higher 
equity values use FCI less. 
The statistical significance of the variable measuring 
farm liquidity also supports the hypothesis about the trade-
off between business and financial risk. The results of 
Model 1991 indicate that farmers enjoying better liquidity 
are less likely to buy FCI. Liquid assets (money in bank 
accounts, CDs, mutual funds, and crops and livestock ready 
for sale) constitute the financial reserves of a farm. In 
case of crop failure, suchreserves can be rapidly liquidated 
to meet farmers' financial obligations resulting from farming 
as well as to pay for family living expenses. Consequently, 
farmers with a higher value of liquid assets are better 
prepared to withstand difficulties resulting from lost crop 
and, thus, lost income. Higher liquidity, then, allows lower 
FCI coverage. Figure 6.5 illustrates the effects of changes 
in farm liquidity on the FCI probabilities. For instance, a 
twenty thousand dollar change in liquid asset values results 
in approximately a 4% change in the FCI probabilities . In 
other words, increased farm liquidity reduces the probability 
that FCI is always used and increases the probability that it 
is not used at all. Therefore, farmers with higher liquidity 
seem to be less inclined to buy FCI. 
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1 .. 
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Model 1993 also offers some evidence supporting the 
trade-off between business and financial risk. The results 
indicate that risk bearing capacity of a farm is also an 
important factor influencing the FCI participation decision. 
Farms with higher total risk tolerance are less likely to buy 
FCI. Higher risk bearing capacity results from lower 
financial leverage and higher farm efficiency and reduces the 
negative impact of crop shortfall and resulting income losses 
on a farm business. Less debt financing and higher 
efficiency may, therefore, reduce the need to control farm 
risk exposure itself. In other words, lower financial 
leverage and higher farm efficiency may result in less 
intense use of crop insurance. 
The impact of changes in farm financial leverage is 
illustrated in Figure 6.6. Consider an example of a farmer 
who takes out a new loan which results in an increase in the 
farm debt-to-equity ratio from, say, 0.20 to 0.40. According 
to the results of Model 1993, the probability that the farmer 
will always buy FCI for his crops rises only by 0.01%. 
Hence, the impact of farm financial leverage on the FCI 
probabilities is quite small. 
As to the impact of farm efficiency on the FCI 
probabilities, the analysis does not provide conclusive 
results. The farm gross ratio, the ratio of operating 
expenses to gross farm sales, suggests that less efficient 
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farms tend to use FCI more often. This is illustrated in 
Figure 6.7. For instance, if, say, a 10% increase in 
operating expenses does not result in higher farm sales, in 
other words, if it results in 10% lower farm efficiency, the 
probability that a farmer will always buy FCI rises by 
approximately 12%. 
To the contrary, farm profit margin, the ratio of net 
income to farm gross sales, indicates more intense use of FCI 
by more capital efficient farm operations. Figure 6.8 
depicts the changes in the predicted FCI probabilities 
resulting from changes in farm efficiency measured by the 
profit margin ratio. For farms with the higher profit margin 
ratio, the more efficient farms, the probability that FCI is 
never used is lower and the probability that FCI is always 
used is higher. In other words, higher farm efficiency seems 
to increase the likelihood of FCI participation, although 
this effect is only moderate. 
In summary, the analysis showed that lower values of 
farm equity are likely to encourage FCI participation. Also, 
farm financial performance, and, consequently, farm risk 
bearing capacity seem to play an important role in FCI 
decisions. In particular, farmers experiencing lower 
liquidity and higher relative debt levels are more likely to 
use FCI as a way of controlling their business risk exposure. 
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However, the results are inconclusive as to the impact of 
farm efficiency on the use of FCI. 
The location of a farm operation 
The last set of the explanatory variables reflected farm 
location. out of eight crop reporting district dummy 
variables (CRD), only two were significant: a dummy for the 
location of a farm in the third crop reporting district 
(north-east) and the dummy for the ninth crop reporting 
district (south-east) . 
However, the impact on FCI is not the same for the two 
regions. The results of both models suggest that farmers 
whose farming operations are in North-Eastern Iowa are less 
likely to participate in the FCIP. To the contrary, farmers 
operating in South-Eastern Iowa seem to buy FCI more often. 
The location dummy variables may reflect a number of 
factors such as differences in soil types and conditions, 
weather patterns, enterprise mix, and ethnic group. Still 
other factors possibly picked up by the location dummies are 
farmers' risk aversion or past FCI experience. Of course, 
many other attributes of individual production areas that 
increase the risk of crop shortfall may also be captured by 
the crop reporting district dummy variables. 
Consider first North-Eastern part of Iowa. Farms in 
that area tend to be smaller compared to Iowa average farm 
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size. In addition, they are heavily specialized in dairy 
production. Hence, the result that farmers in North-Eastern 
Iowa tend to use FCI less often seems to match these facts. 
On the other hand, South-Eastern Iowa is a part of the 
southern pasture area. Also, many farmers argue that 
Southern Iowa experiences droughts more often than other 
parts of the state (Khojasteh, 1992). In fact, past FCI 
experience shows that this may well be true. The average 
FCIP loss ratios during the 80's for both corn and soybeans 
exceeded one for the southern and south-eastern parts of Iowa 
(Glauber, 1993). On the other hand, as shown in Table 1.2, 
average FCIP loss ratios for the rest of the Iowa were below 
one during the same time period. A loss ratio higher than 
one indicates that the premiums paid were lower than the 
indemnities received for a given time period. This suggests 
that buying FCI is, on average, a profitable option for 
farmers in south-eastern parts of Iowa. 
Figure 6.9 compares the differences in the FCI 
probabilities (for all five intensity levels of FCI use, in 
this case) predicted by Model 1991 for a farm located in 
North-Eastern Iowa and for a farm located elsewhere. Figure 
6.10 shows the same comparison for Model 1993. 
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Iowa and a farm located elsewhere 
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Similarly, Figures 6.11 and 6.12 depict the differences in 
the predicted FCI probabilities for South-Eastern Iowa. 
In summary, the results indicate that farm location is 
an important factor influencing the intensity of the use of 
FCI. Farmers producing in North-Eastern Iowa are less likely 
to buy FCI, whereas the opposite is true for farmers in 
South-Eastern Iowa. 
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7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
original Hypothesis 
The Federal Crop Insurance Program (FCIP) provides 
subsidized multiple peril crop insurance for farmers in all 
counties with significant agricultural production. Federal 
Crop Insurance (FCI) participation remains low despite 
several design changes adopted in 1980 and thereafter. 
Actuarially unfair FCI premiums and the availability of 
government disaster payments are commonly blamed for causing 
low FCI participation. However, participation in the program 
is low even in areas where FCI premiums seem to be 
actuarially fair. This suggests that forces other than FCI 
premiums influence farmers' decision to participate in FCI. 
Based on the conceptual model presented in Chapter 2 and on 
previous studies reviewed in Chapter 3, five groups of 
factors that might influence the use of FCI in addition to 
the FCI premiums and disaster programs were identified. 
First, demographic characteristics may have a direct or 
indirect impact on farmers' decisions to buy FCI. Younger 
farmers, with less experience and higher education were 
expected to be more likely to use FCI than older farmers with 
lower education . Younger farmers tend to operate larger 
farms, rent more land, and have relat ively more debt and less 
equity. Also, farmers with higher education may have better 
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knowledge and understanding of risk issues and the use of 
risk transfer tools. 
A second group of factors hypothesized to be relevant to 
the FCI decision were farm characteristics. Larger, less 
diversified farms and farms with relatively more rented land 
were expected to use FCI more often because of their higher 
risk exposure. 
The use of business risk management tools was the next 
group of factors with a possible influence on the FCI 
participation decision. Six management strategies were 
considered: crop-hail insurance, participation in government 
programs, forward contracting, hedging, commodity options, 
and crop share leases. The business risk management 
strategies were hypothesized to be complements to the use of 
FCI since they help manage different types of business risk 
than does FCI. Also, the use of the business risk tools may 
reflect farmers' overall attitude toward business risk. 
Risk balancing concept suggests that the farm financial 
structure should influence the FCI participation decision. 
Lower financial leverage, higher credit reserves, and better 
financial performance of a farm operation indicates a lower 
level of financial risk and higher risk bearing capacity of 
the farm. According to the risk balancing concept, a lower 
level of financial risk and higher total risk tolerance of a 
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farm should allow more business risk exposure, and, thus, may 
be substituted for FCI. 
Finally, due to differences in soil and weather 
conditions, as well as enterprise mix across the State of 
Iowa, farm location may also influence farmers' decision to 
buy FCI . 
Findings 
Both logistic regression models, differing only in the 
sample analyzed, were statistically significant at 1% level 
allowing the rejection of the joint hypothesis that variables 
included in the models did not help significantly in 
explaining the use of FCI. The prediction rate, the 
proportion of the responses predicted correctly, was 70% for 
Model 1991 and 78% for Model 1993. The low values of the 
pseudo-R2 ratio (0.09 for Model 1991 and 0.17 for Model 1993) 
can be attributed to the cross-sectional type of the data 
analyzed. In addition, the impact of the FCI premiums, the 
availability of disaster payments, and possibly other factors 
relevant to the FCI participation decision were not 
considered which may also be reflected in the low R2 values. 
Most of the results support the original hypothesis 
about the relationship between the use of FCI and the 
explanatory variables. The use of three business risk 
management tools, hail insurance, government programs, and 
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commodity options, appears to have a significant impact on 
the use of FCI. The results lead to the conclusion that hail 
insurance, government programs, and commodity options appear 
to be perceived by farmers as complements to FCI. 
Also, the analysis seems to support the concept of the 
trade-off between business and financial risk. The results 
imply that farmers who face relatively lower financial risk, 
in other words, farmers with relatively lower debt levels and 
higher credit reserve seem to be less likely to buy Federal 
Crop Insurance. However, the results are inconclusive as to 
the farm efficiency and its influence on the use of FCI . 
Finally, the location of a farm operation seems to play 
a significant role in farmers' FCI participation decision. 
Farmers operating in areas with higher exposure to risk 
appear to be more likely to buy FCI. On the other hand, 
farmers in areas more specialized on dairy production seem to 
participate in the FCIP less often . 
The analysis does not show evidence that a farmer's age , 
experience, or education have a significant impact on the use 
of FCI. However, these factors might have effected FCI 
decisions indirectly through debt and equity levels, the 
relative amount of land rented, or the use of risk management 
tools. Also, the hypothesis that larger and less diversified 
farms would purchase FCI more frequently was not confirmed. 
Finally, the use of crop share leases, forward contracting, 
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and hedging, as well as holding debt from the Farmers Home 
Administration do not appear to be relevant to the FCI 
participation decision. 
conclusions and Need for Further Research 
This study attempted to show that factors beyond the 
FCI premiums and the availability of government disaster 
payments influence farmers' decision to participate in the 
Federal Crop Insurance Program. The uniqueness of the data 
analyzed in this study is in that they accommodated more 
detailed examination of the impact of farm financial 
performance and the use of business risk tools on the use of 
FCI. The results of the analysis support the hypothesis 
about the presence of influences other than the FCI premiums 
and disaster payments in farmers' decisions to participate 
in FCI. 
First, it appears that farmers' use of the business risk 
management tools, such as hail insurance, government 
programs, and commodity options, has a positive impact on the 
use of FCI. Farmers who use hail insurance, government 
programs, and commodity options more often are more likely to 
participate in FCI as well. In other words, farmers seem to 
perceive various price and yield risk reducing instruments as 
complements to FCI and use them together with FCI in an 
integrated risk management strategy. This result may be a 
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reflection of farmers' attitude toward risk and their 
familiarity with the ways of managing agricultural risk. 
Consequently, educational programs targeting farmers' 
awareness of risk as well as their understanding of available 
risk management strategies may contribute to the 
understanding of the way Federal Crop Insurance protects 
farmers and possibly increase FCI participation. 
Second, the analysis offers some evidence supporting the 
concept of the trade-off between business and financial risk 
outlined by Gabriel and Baker (1980) and Collins (1985). The 
notion of the risk trade-off, or risk balancing, implies that 
a lower level of financial risk allows a higher level of 
business risk, and vice versa. The lower level of financial 
risk results, in part, from lower relative debt levels. 
Another factor that reduces farm financial risk is the credit 
reserve in the form of either farm equity or liquid asset 
holdings. The results of this study demonstrate that all of 
these financial risk reducing factors, relative debt level, 
the value of net worth, and liquidity, appear to be relevant 
to farmers' decision to buy Federal Crop Insurance. In other 
words, lower relative farm indebtness and higher credit 
reserve seem to be substituted for FCI by Iowa farmers. The 
results, thus, imply that buying FCI may not be considered an 
attractive alternative for financially strong farms. The low 
participation in the FCIP may, therefore, be a result of low 
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levels of financial risk for at least some farm operators. 
In other words, it appears that the goal of achieving higher 
FCI participation rates may not justified from the point of 
view of farmers . Consequently, an alternative FCI program 
that can be actaurially sound and profitable at a 
participation rate l ower than 50 % (identified as a break-
even point for the current FCIP design) should be considered. 
Obviously, an approach different than the one adopted in this 
study would be necessary to allow evaluation of alternative 
FCI designs. 
In addition to business risk and financial decisions of 
a farm operator, the location of a farm operation seems to be 
another important factor influencing farmers' decision to buy 
Federal Crop Insurance. Farmers in areas with relatively 
higher risk exposure appear to be more interested in the 
FCIP . On the other hand, farmers in areas with lower yield 
risk seem to participate in FCI less frequently. The fact 
that the farm's location appears to be relevant to the 
decision to purchase FCI stresses the need for actuarially 
sound FCI premiums accurately reflecting relative risk 
exposure of individual farmers and different areas. 
Despite these new insights into individual farmers' 
decisions to participate in Federal Crop Insurance, several 
issues remain to be examined. First , several explanatory 
variables used in the regression appear to indirectly reflect 
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the influence of farm size on the use of FCI. Models that 
would investigate the impact of the size of a farm operation 
on the FCI probabilities should, therefore, be considered. 
Second, the results presented here do not lead to a 
straightforward conclusion about the impact of the relative 
amount of rented land on FCI participation. Subsequent 
studies may, therefore, focus on relating an increase in risk 
exposure resulting from land rental arrangements to farmers' 
decision to buy FCI. 
Still another issue that deserves further consideration 
is the influence of forward pricing instruments, such as 
forward contracting and hedging with futures markets, and the 
impact of farm efficiency on farmers' decision to purchase 
FCI. 
Also, individual farmers' risk exposure itself, 
expressed perhaps in terms of yield variability, and farmers' 
risk aversion may be examined in future studies of FCI use. 
Finally, models using an objectively measured dependent 
variable, such as the proportion of expected output insured 
by FCI, or effective FCI coverage levels, rather than a scale 
variable, may offer further insights to farmers' decision to 
participate in Federal Crop Insurance. 
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1991 Farm Finance Survey 
1. In what county is most of your farming operation located? 
2. What is your age? 
3. How many dependents are you supporting (including yourself)? 
4. How many of these dependents are under 18 years of age? 
5. What is the highest level of school 
circle one)? 
a. Husband 
b. Wife 
High School 
High School 
6. How many years have you been farming? 
that you have attended (please 
College 
College 
Post Graduate 
Post Graduate 
7. During the 1990 crop year, how many acres did you 
a. own 
b. rent from others 
c. rent to others 
8. Approximately what percent of your 1990 gross farm sales came from each 
of these sources? 
a. crops 
b. beef 
c. pork 
d. dairy 
e. other farm enterprises 
9. Since January 1989, what changes have you made in your farming operation 
(estimate the percentage change in capacity) 
a. land base 
b. livestock facilities 
c. machinery and equipment 
capacity 
d. breeding herd 
increase decrease no change 
10. Which of the following statements best describe your plans for your farm 
business for the indicated time period (check all that apply) 
1991-1995 1996-2000 
a. continue present operation as is 
b. expand land base 
c. expand breeding herd 
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d. expand machinery capacity 
e. rent land out and retire 
f. transfer farm operation to a 
family member and retire 
g. sell out and retire 
h. other 
11. Since January 1989, have you ever requested financing to expand your 
farm business? 
yes 
no (skip to 18) 
12. Was your farm business expansion request approved? 
yes 
no (skip to 16) 
13 . Were you required to make changes in your request for expansion 
financing in order to receive financing? 
yes 
no (skip to 15) 
14. Estimate the percentage change from your original financial request for 
farm business expansion that you were required to make. 
Increase (%) Decrease (%) 
a. the size of the expansion 
b. down payment 
c. term of the loan 
d. interest rate 
e. collateral 
15. Estimate what percent of your expansion financing was obtained from the 
following lenders and indicate how long you have done business with 
each. 
Financino Provided 
(%) 
a. your own funds (equity) including 
trade-in value of machinery 
b. local bank 
c. larger urban bank 
d. Farm Credit System 
e. Fm.HA 
f. insurance company 
Years 
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g. merchant or dealer 
h. individual 
i. other 
100.0 
16. If your loan for the expansion was not approved, check all the reasons 
that apply 
a) income from expansion was too variable 
b) insufficient documentation (budgets, cash flows) 
c) previous loss experience 
d) insufficient cash flow 
e) insufficient collateral 
f) current debt levels were too high 
g) not a profitable expansion 
h) lack of experience with this enterprise 
i) loan was wrong purpose for this lender 
j) other (please indicate) 
17. Did you contact more than one lender about financing your expansion? 
yes 
no 
18 . Has inadequate financing limited the profitability or growth of your 
farm business? 
yes 
no (skip to 21) 
19. If yes, rate the importance of the following impacts of this restriction 
on your farm business (1 = most important, 5 = least important) 
a. modernization of facilities and equipment 1 2 3 4 5 
b. full utilization of facilities or machinery 
1 2 3 4 5 
c. ability to fully employ existing labor force 
1 2 3 4 5 
d. ability to generate adequate family income 1 2 3 4 5 
e. ability to take advantage of future economic 
opportunities 1 2 3 4 5 
f. ability to employ and support additional 
operator or family 1 2 3 4 5 
g. other (please indicate) 1 2 3 4 5 
20. Would you be willing to take on additional debt if your lender offered 
to make credit available? 
yes 
no (skip to 22) 
21. Why have you limited your borrowing? (Check all that apply) 
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a. interest rates are too high 
b. I want to maintain cash reserves 
c. I want to maintain a credit reserve 
d. my lender is unwilling to offer additional credit 
e. profit margins were insufficient 
22. Which risk management strategies do you employ? (Circle) 
f reguency of use 
never sometimes always 
a. multiple peril crop insurance 1 2 3 4 5 
b. hail insurance 1 2 3 4 5 
c . hedging 1 2 3 4 5 
d. forward contracting 1 2 3 4 5 
e. commodity options 1 2 3 4 5 
f. crop share leases 1 2 3 4 5 
g. participate in government programsl 2 3 4 5 
23. From your 1990 tax records (Form 1040, 1040F, 1040E and Form 4797) or 
your farm account book, please list the following information: 
1990 
dollar values 
a. Total Income, (line 23) 
b. Wages and Salaries, (line 7) 
c. Interest and Dividends, (lines Sa + Sb + 9) 
d. Capital Gains or Losses (lines 13 + 14 + 15)~~~~~~ 
1040F 
d. Gross Income, (line 11) 
e. Interest Expense, (lines 23a + 23b) 
f. Depreciation, (line 16) 
g. Total Expenses, (line 35) 
1040E 
h. Net farm rental income received 
i. Sale of breeding stock, (line lS) 
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24. What was the approximate market value of farm and financial assets you 
have owned the past two years? Please use your financial statements if 
available: 
Jan. 1990 Jan. 1991 
a. Cash in checking, savings accounts 
b. Financial investments 
(CD's, mutual funds} 
c. Crops and livestock for sale 
(including CCC crops under loan) 
d. Machinery, equipment, breeding stock~~~~~ 
e. Land and buildings 
f. Total assets 
25 . Please list your outstanding loan balances for farm real estate and farm 
non-real estate debt by type of lender on January 1, 1990, and 1991. 
Non-Real Estate Debt 
Jan.1990 Jan.1991 
a. Bank 
b. Farm Credit System 
c . Farmers Home Admin. 
d . Insurance company 
e. Individual 
f. Merchant or dealer 
g. Other loans 
(including CCC} 
h. Total debt 
Real Estate Debt 
Jan.1990 Jan.1991 
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APPENDIX B: A SAMPLE 1993 FARM FINANCE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
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1993 Farm Finance Survey 
Information About You and Your Farm 
1. In what county is most of your farming operation 
located? 
2. What is your age? ------
3. How many dependents are you supporting 
yourself)? -------
(including 
4. How many of these dependents are under age 18? ______ _ 
5. Please enter the number that corresponds with the highest 
level of education that you have completed? 
Wife: 1.high school 2.comm. college 3.college 4.post 
graduate 
Husband: 1.high school 2.comm. college 3.college 4.post 
graduate 
6. How many years have you been farming? ------
7. During the 199 2 crop year, how many acres did you: 
a. Own 
b. Rent from others 
c. Rent to others 
8. How do you describe your farming operatio? (Please check 
one) 
a. Family or individual operation (do not include 
partnership and corporation) 
b. Partnership operation (include family partnerships) 
c. Corporation 
9. Number of households or families involved in the farming 
operation 
10. Approximately what percent of your 1992 gross farm sales 
came from each of these sources? 
a. Crops % 
b. Beef % 
c. Pork % 
d. Dairy % 
e. Other farm enterprises % 
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credit Available for Expansion 
11. over the past two years, since January 1991, have you ever 
requested financing from a credit institution to expand 
your farm business? 
Yes ___ _ 
No (skip to 15) 
12. Was your farm business expansion request? (check one) 
Completely approved 
Partially approved 
Was not approved (skip to 14) 
13. If your financing request was approved (completely or 
partially) , please indicate the total amount borrowed and 
the average terms of the loan(s). 
Use of Borrowed Amount Interest Rate Length of 
Funds Borrowed (%) Loan 
($) (years) 
Machinery, 
equipment 
Breeding 
livestock 
Livestock 
facilities 
Other 
agricultural 
buildings 
Land 
Other 
14. If your loan for the expansion was not approved, check all 
reasons that apply. 
a. Income from expansion was too variable 
b. Insufficient documentation (budget or cash flow) 
c. Previous loss experience 
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d. Insufficient cash flow 
e. Insufficient collateral 
f. current debt levels were too high 
g. Not a profitable expansion 
h. Lack of experience with this enterprise 
i. Loan was wrong purpose for this lender 
j. Other (please indicate) ______________ ~ 
15 . Has inadequate financing limited the profitability or 
growth of your farm business? 
Yes ---No ----
16. Would you be willing to take on additional debt for 
expansion if your lender offered to make credit available? 
Yes 
No----
17. Please indicate the reasons why you have chosen to limit 
borrowing levels. (check all that apply) 
a. Interest rates are too high 
b. I want to maintain cash reserves 
c . I want to maintain a credit reserve 
d . Profit margins are insufficient 
e . My lender is unwilling to offer additional credit 
f. Other (Explain) 
Risk Management 
18. Which risk management strategies do you use? Indicate the 
frequency with which you use these tools (please circle) 
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Freguency of Use 
Never Seldom Half Most of Always 
of time time 
a. MPCI 1 2 3 4 5 
b. Hail insurance 1 2 3 4 5 
c. Hedging 1 2 3 4 5 
d. Forward contracting 1 2 3 4 5 
e. Commodity options 1 2 3 4 5 
f. Crop share leases 1 2 3 4 5 
g. Participate in 
government programs 1 2 3 4 5 
19. Please describe your crop production and insurance program 
for corn and soybeans produced in 1992. 
Insured 
Planted Multi12le 12eril Cro12-Hail 
Crop (acres) (acres) (acres) 
Corn 
Soybeans 
20. Please describe your typical MPCI program 
Crop Average APH• Coverage Elected Premium 
Yield level Price ($I ac.) 
bu. /ac. (35, 50, 65, ($/bu.) 
75%) 
Corn 
Soybeans 
·APH is actual production history 
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Use of Merchant and Dealer Credit 
Increasingly farmers are turning to institutions other than 
banks or the Farm Credit System for non-real estate financing. 
In this section we ask a few questions about your use of 
nontraditional credit suppliers, such as your local coop, a 
farm supply firm, an equipment manufacturer or a machinery 
dealer. 
21. Since January 1, 1992 have you received non-real estate 
credit from a commercial source other than a bank or the 
Farm Credit System? 
Yes -----No (skip to 24) 
If you answered yes, please complete the following: 
Use of Credit Amount Borrowed Loan Term Interest Rate 
($) (months) (%) 
Seed, 
fertilizer 
Feed 
Feeder 
livestock 
Machinery, 
equipment 
Grain storage 
Livestock 
facilities 
Other 
22. Please indicate the importance of the following reasons 
for using these "nontraditional" credit suppliers. Rate 
each item on the five-point scale with a 11 1 11 being not 
important and "5" being very important. 
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Not Important Very Important 
1. Easy to obtain 1 2 3 4 5 
(limited paperwork, 
quick approval) 
2. Competitive interest rates 1 2 3 4 
3. Can't obtain credit elsewhere 1 2 3 4 
4. Loan size restricted by banks's 
legal lending limits 1 2 3 4 
5. Other 
23. Which nontraditional credit supplier did you use during 
this period? (check all that apply) 
Local coop 
Regional coop 
Private farm supply firm 
Machinery dealer 
Livestock contracting firm 
Other: 
Farm Income and Balance Sheet 
5 
5 
5 
24. From your 1992 tax records (form 1040, 1040F, Form 4S35, 
and Form 4797) or your farm account book, please list the 
following information: 
1040 Form 
a. Total income, (line 23) 
b. Wages and salaries, (line 7) 
c. Interest and dividends, (line Sa + Sb +9) 
d. Capital gains or losses (lines 13+14+15} ------
1040F Form 
e. Gross income, (line 11} 
f. Interest expense, (lines 23a + 23b} 
g. Depreciation (line 16) 
h. Total expenses, (line 36) 
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Form 4835 
i. Net cash and share rental income received from farm 
property (line 32) 
4797 Form 
j. Gain from sales of farm property excluding land (Parts 
I,II and III) 
25. What was the approximate market value of farm and 
financial assets you have owned the past two years? 
(please use financial statements if available) 
a. Cash in checking, savings 
accounts 
b . Financial investments (CDs , 
mutual funds) 
Jan . 1992 
c. Crops and livestock for sale 
(including CCC crops under loan) 
d. Machinery, equipment, breedi ng 
stock 
e. Land and buildings 
f. Total assets 
Jan. 1993 
26 . Please list your outstanding loan balances for farm real 
estate and farm non- real estate debt by type of lender on 
January 1, 1992 and 199 3 . 
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Non-Real Estate Debt Real Estate Debt 
Jan. 1992 Jan. 1993 Jan. 1992 Jan. 
a. Bank 
b. Farm Credit 
System 
c. FrnHA 
d. Insurance 
Company 
e. Individual 
f. Merchant or 
dealer 
g. Other loans 
(incl. CCC) 
h. Total debt 
Note: If you have a question that requires an answer from 
the ISO Economics Department, please complete the following: 
I authorize Iowa Agricultural statistics to forward my name and 
address to Dr. Robert Jolly, ISU, Economics Department, for 
response to my questions. 
(Town) (Zip) 
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